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ABSTRACT 
South Korean security has been threatened by North Korea since the Korean War.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union has required Northeast Asian regional security to be 
reconfigured.  North Korea remains as South Korea’s primary threat.  China is emerging 
rapidly and creating several issues directly and indirectly that are related to South Korea.  
Especially, China’s PLA modernization has been remarkable in its capability and 
ambition.  Therefore, threats imposed by China to South Korea may seem significant.  
Directly, dispute in Socotra Rock and the Northeast Project impose threats to South 
Korea.  The Taiwan issue and the South China Sea dispute indirectly affect South Korean 
security due to the involvement of the United States forces in the Northeast Asian region.  
This thesis will reveal that China’s PLA modernization coerces South Korea to confront 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii




C. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................5 
1. The South Korean Perspective on the DPRK....................................5 
2. The South Korean Perspective on China...........................................7 
3. The South Korean Perspective on the United States ........................8 
4. Recent PLA Modernization ..............................................................10 
II. PLA MODERNIZATION.........................................................................................13 
A. DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ........................................14 
1. Domestic Influence.............................................................................14 
2. External Influence..............................................................................16 
B. CHANGE IN DOCTRINE............................................................................17 
1. People’s War.......................................................................................18 
2. People’s War under Modern Conditions.........................................19 
3. Limited and Local War .....................................................................20 
4. Limited and Local War under High-tech Conditions ....................23 
5. Conclusion ..........................................................................................25 
C. PLA-GROUND, PLA-MARITIME, AND PLA-AIR FORCE..................26 
1. PLA Ground Force ............................................................................26 




2. PLA Maritime Force: PLAN (PLA Navy).......................................28 
a. Strategic Paradigm..................................................................28 
b. Size and Capability..................................................................29 
c. Aircraft Carrier .......................................................................32 
d. Conclusion...............................................................................33 
3. PLA Air Force (PLAAF) ...................................................................34 
a. Doctrine ...................................................................................34 
b. Quantity and Quality...............................................................35 
c. Conclusion...............................................................................37 
D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................38 
III. RELATIONSHIPS OF SOUTH KOREA, CHINA, AND THE UNITED 
STATES ......................................................................................................................41 
A. SOUTH KROEA—CHINA RELATIONSHIP...........................................42 
1. Diplomatic Aspect ..............................................................................43 
2. Information Aspect ............................................................................45 
3. Military Aspect...................................................................................46 
4. Economic Aspect ................................................................................47 
 viii
5. Conclusion ..........................................................................................48 
B. SOUTH KOREA--THE UNITED STATES RELATIONSHIP ................49 
1. Diplomatic Aspect ..............................................................................50 
2. Information Aspect ............................................................................51 
3. Military Aspect...................................................................................53 
4. Economic Aspect ................................................................................55 
5. Conclusion ..........................................................................................56 
IV. PROBLEM ANALYSIS ............................................................................................59 
A. DIRECT THREAT TO SOUTH KOREAN SECURITY ..........................60 
1. The Socotra Rock Dispute.................................................................60 
a. Diplomatic Aspect of the Socotra Rock Dispute ....................60 
b. Informational Aspect of Socotra Rock Dispute .....................61 
c. Economic Aspect of Socotra Rock Dispute............................62 
d. Military Aspect of Socotra Rock Dispute ...............................62 
e. Conclusion...............................................................................64 
2. The Northeast Project........................................................................64 
a. Diplomatic Aspect of the Northeast Project ...........................65 
b. Informational Aspect of the Northeast Project......................66 
c. Military Aspect of the Northeast Project................................68 
d. Economic Aspect of the Northeast Project.............................68 
e. Conclusion...............................................................................69 
3. Conclusion ..........................................................................................69 
B. INDIRECT THREAT TO SOUTH KOREAN SECURITY......................70 
1. Taiwan and South China Sea Issue ..................................................70 
2. Conclusion ..........................................................................................73 
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................75 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................77 




I would like to express my sincere appreciation and gratitude to Dr. Miller and 
COL Chakwin for their discerning wisdom, knowledge, guidance, time, and patience.  
Also, it was my honor to study in the United States Naval Postgraduate School.  Without 
the vast material and support from the staff and fulfilling academic requirements, this 
achievement would not have been possible.   
Finally, this thesis would not have been possible without the support, love, and 
encouragement of my lovely and beautiful wife, Heeyoung Kang.   
I thank you all for everything. 
 x





The area of investigation of this thesis is the impact of the modernization of 
military capabilities and doctrine of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter China) 
People’s Liberation Army (hereafter PLA), on the Republic of Korea’s (hereafter South 
Korea) security policy.  First, it will provide an overview and assess PLA modernization, 
where it is and where its modernizations suggest it is heading.  Second, it will examine 
the security interests of major players in the region and the relationships of South Korea 
to others.  Third, it will argue that PLA modernization does pose a threat to South 
Korea’s security, directly and indirectly.  China’s territorial disputes, and interpretation of 
history, on top of enhancement of military capability may become direct threats to South 
Korea, and China’s conflicts and flashpoints with other nations in the region, which 
involves the United States, may become indirect threats to South Korea.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
Before the Korean War, the Korean peninsula was divided into two nations: the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereafter the DPRK) and the Republic of Korea.  
The separation was a result of the interests of global powers’ ideological differences and 
the pursuit of legitimacy by two competing domestic political elites.1  That separation has 
lasted more than five decades, and each side still considers the other as the main threat to 
its security. 
There is no doubt that South Korea considers the DPRK its primary security 
threat.  The numbers and power of the military forces stationed along the border at the 
38th parallel are conclusive evidence of that reality.  Despite South Korea’s economic 
                                                 
1 Han S. Park, “The Nature and Evolution of the Inter-Korean Legitimacy War.” In Park and Kim, 
Korean Security Dynamics in Transition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 14–15. 
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support and the “sunshine” policy initiated by President Kim Dae Jung, the DPRK still 
continues to provoke South Korea both militarily and diplomatically.2     
In 1985, China, a geographical neighbor to both the DPRK and South Korea, re-
evaluated its own security perspective.  The preceding conditions on the Korean 
peninsula, followed shortly thereafter in 1991 by the collapse of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (hereafter Soviet Union), transformed the northeast Asian regional 
security environment in several ways.  For purposes of this thesis, the most notable 
development was the significant reduction of Chinese assistance and support to the 
DPRK.   
An important question for South Korean security decision makers, therefore, is 
whether China’s emerging power in the Northeast Asian region and its military 
modernization threaten Korea.  Considering the rapprochement between China and South 
Korea in 1992, their continuous economic trade relationship, and China’s role between 
South Korea, the DPRK, and China, it is tempting to believe that China is not a 
significant threat to South Korea.  
One consequence of the development of China’s security capabilities, including 
PLA modernization, is that any potential conflict in Northeast Asia would involve 
sophisticated forces and potentially large numbers of forces. This potentiality, remote as 
it may seem, may cause changes in the security policies of the United States, Japan, and 
Taiwan.  These potential changes in policy, in turn, may have the potential to undermine 
South Korean security.  Therefore, the indirect threat to South Korean security is a real 
consideration, and considering both the potential and degree of this threat is important, 
perhaps as important a mission as the analysis of any direct threat. 
This thesis investigates and assesses whether PLA modernization presents a direct 
or indirect threat to the peninsula.  Additionally, it investigates the logic underlying South 
Korea’s security policy to ascertain how and why PLA modernization is an important 
factor in that policy. 
                                                 
2 Sang-Hun Choe, “South Korea’s Sunshine Policy Dims,” The New York Times, January 17, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/17/world/asia/17korea.html?scp=1&sq=South Korea%27s Sunshine 
Policy Dims&st=cse (accessed May 9, 2009). 
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES  
Developing an appropriate frame of reference for the major questions that support 
this research requires analysis of the following aspects:   
• First, analysis of the four elements of national power (diplomatic, 
informational, military, and economic) to determine how relevant they are 
to South Korean security policy vis-à-vis the DPRK.   
• Second, analysis of the PLA, including investigating the chronology, 
overarching goals and the rationale for PLA modernization.  In addition, 
PLA current capabilities and the prospects for PLA power projection and 
doctrine for the PLA Army, Navy, Air Force and strategic arsenals are 
also points of approach for this element.   
• Third a major area is the analysis of the possible direct and indirect threats 
to South Korea caused by PLA modernization.  Direct threats are analyzed 
regarding four elements of national power and through examination of 
illustrative examples of conflicts and cooperation between China and 
South Korea.  These include: the Socotra Rock dispute, China’s Northeast 
Project, and the DPRK nuclear crisis and Six-Party Talks.  The indirect 
threat will be examined through consideration of other potential conflicts 
in Northeast Asia, such as in the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands 
dispute, and the potential “second order effects” on South Korea. 
 
The relevant hypotheses in this thesis do not include any analytical focus on the 
domestic factors for security policy either in South Korea’s or China’s domestic issues 
with the PLA.  Additionally, to ensure the focus of this research remains fixed on the 
South Korean security aspect of these issues, PLA modernization is assumed to continue 
into the near future as it has been accomplished by China up to the present. (For example, 
the range or potential variations in PLA developments are not reconsidered against the 
range of assessments on China’s potential for economic development in the future.)    
Based on current world conditions and commonly known facts, any research on 
South Korea security focuses on the DPRK.  Even today, the DPRK remains the major 
threat to South Korean security.  China, which provided hundreds of thousands of troops 
in support of the DPRK attack of South Korea in 1950, today is not assessed by any 
strategic analysts on the peninsula as significant a direct security threat to South Korea as 
the DPRK.  Based on current China-South Korea relations and recent experience, even in 
territorial disputes and frictions on the veracity and interpretation of historical issues, 
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leaders in both South Korea and China would prefer to decrease tensions and resolve any 
conflicts peacefully in order to promote positive bilateral economic interests.  
Additionally, China’s interest in maintaining its position as one of the few nations 
possessing a positive relationship with both the DPRK and South Korea serves to reduce 
the threatening role of China in South Korean security.   
The indirect security threat posed by China, however, may be more significant.  
Since the end of the Second World War, and particularly after the Korean War Armistice, 
South Korea’s security has relied on a significant U.S. presence on the peninsula, 
including military forces, equipment and agreements.  Any potential security crisis that 
might influence the United States—and its tangible and symbolic presence in South 
Korea, might evolve into a threat to South Korean security.   
More to the point, potential Chinese sovereignty disputes might involve the 
United States, or a de facto U.S. ally such as Taiwan. This condition might include the 
possibility of U.S. intervention into that dispute. Were this to occur, it could have a 
second order effect, creating a dilemma for South Korea. South Korea, a treaty ally of the 
United States, may have to consider the effects of these disputes on its own interests or 
security.  For this reason, South Korean security policy decision makers will still think it 
important to consider PLA capabilities, since PLA actions may wind up indirectly or 
possibly directly influencing South Korea security conditions.  
This thesis suggests as its working hypothesis that given the conditions defined 
and explained in the thesis, South Korean security policy decision makers should 
continue to develop South Korean military capabilities and to continue to strengthen the 
overall alliance with the United States.  In addition, the thesis concludes that additional 
measures to build deterrence by increasing economic relations and cooperative diplomacy 
with China also are essential to the successful security policy for South Korea, due to the 
indirect threat. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. The South Korean Perspective on the DPRK 
Not surprisingly, most of the literature on South Korean security has focused on 
the threat from the North.  Paul French states that the DPRK still maintains a “Stalinist-
style command economy.”3  David Shambaugh notes that the DPRK is constantly using a 
brinkmanship strategy against international society, particularly through its deliberate 
ambiguity in its strategic arsenal capability. These, and other factors, make the DPRK 
more isolated in international society and created negative perceptions of the DPRK by 
others.4   
Avery Goldstein concludes that the DPRK has been isolated and has isolated itself 
from most of the world community since the collapse of the Soviet Union.5  Samuel S. 
Kim notes that, in addition, after China changed its approach to the Peninsula in favor of 
a “Two Korea policy,” the DPRK has taken more irrational decisions.6   
In an article from the New York Times, Choe Sang-Hun comments that in the 
recent past, South Korea adopted a moderate policy—the “sunshine policy”—to open the 
DPRK to international society.  This approach later was regarded by others as “being too 
soft on the Communist government there.”  It sought to mediate tension created by the 
DPRK by providing compensation.7 
When the DPRK “played its nuclear program card” in 1994, South Korea could 
not afford to have another Korean War on the peninsula.  At the same time, China was 
not willing to face South Korea or allow the United States directly to take over a 
                                                 
3 Paul French, North Korea the Paranoid Peninsula (New York: Zed Books Ltd., 2005), 1. 
4 David Shambaugh, “China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term.” The Washington 
Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 43–56. 
5 Avery Goldstein, “Across the Yalu: China’s interests and the Korean peninsula in a changing world.” 
In Alasair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross eds., New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy 
(Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2006), 132–139. 
6 Samuel S. Kim, “The Making of china’s Korea Policy in the Era of Reform.” In David Lampton eds., 
The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform (Stanford California: Stanford 
University Press, 2001), 374–381.   
7 Sang-Hun Choe, “South Korea’s Sunshine Policy Dims,” The New York times, January 17, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/17/world/asia/17korea.html?scp=1&sq=South Korea%27s Sunshine 
Policy Dims&st=cse (accessed May 9, 2009). 
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collapsed DPRK. Furthermore, according to Andrew Scobell, China was also concerned 
about chaos and the influx of refugees along its border with the DPRK.  Therefore, China 
and South Korea were opposed to any economic and military coercive sanctions on the 
DPRK by the United States.8   
Yong Jeong Lee notes that recently the DPRK conducted a nuclear experiment of 
a large scale, right after its test of a long-range ballistic missile or rocket.9  Such actions 
caused South Korea to declare support for full-scale PSI (Proliferation Security 
Initiative).  In addition, Myung Bok Bae, Hyung Kyu Choi, and Sae Jeong Jang note that 
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented that China is firmly against the DPRK’s 
actions.10    
For all these reasons, the DPRK remains South Korea’s primary security threat.  
The DPRK maintains a “military first” strategy and stations massive military forces along 
the DMZ (De-Militarized Zone) facing South Korea.  Moreover, it continues to utilize its 
nuclear program and missile tests in violation of a UN resolution.  Therefore, South 
Korea cannot stop considering the DPRK as the primary threat to its security. 
Jungsup Kim explores other aspects of the DPRK’s approach and notes that there 
is a debate over whether the tensions between South Korea and the DPRK are driven by 
other reasons.11  Regardless of motivations, however, given the objective reality of forces 
arrayed on the DPRK border against South Korea, and the continuing history of 
provocations, South Korea’s leaders have concluded that their security requirements 
cannot rely on varying interpretations or assumptions; a preventive capability must be 
 
                                                 
8 Andrew Scobell, China and North Korea: From comrades-in-arms to allies at arm’s length (Carlisle, 
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, 2004), 29–33. 
9 Yong Jeong Lee, “Bukhan 2cha haeksilheum Eui Ryuk 1cha Ddaeboda 5Bae Saejeotda [North 
Korea’s 2nd Nuclear experiment is five times greater then 1st experiment],” JoongAng Ilbo, May 26, 2009, 
http://article.joins.com/article/article.asp?ctg=10&Total_ID=3622502 (accessed May 27, 2009). 
10 Myung Bok Bae, Hyung Kyu Choi, and Sae Jeong Jang, “Bulkoehan Jungguk ‘Bihaekhwa Yaksok 
Jikigo 6Jahoedameuro Bokguihaeya’ [Discomforted China ‘Keep Free Nuclear promise and must 
comeback to Six-party Talk’],” JoongAng Ilbo, May 26, 2009, 
http://article.joins.com/article/article.asp?ctg=10&Total_ID=3622494 (accessed May 28, 2009). 
11 Jungsup Kim, International politics and Security in Korea (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 
2007), 1–18. 
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prepared before it is necessary.  By actions, by general analytical assessment, and even 
by planning, it is conclusive that the DPRK is South Korea’s primary security threat and 
South Korea must act accordingly. 
2. The South Korean Perspective on China 
The emergence of China in Northeast Asia is not news.  It is generally considered 
as fact.  Ever since the Deng Xiaoping era, China has started to transform and begun to 
open up.  Mel Gurtov and Byong-moo Hwang note that especially after 1985, China has 
re-evaluated its security conditions and modernized the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
accordingly.12  Furthermore, Tae Hwan Lee mentions that in the 2000s, China once again 
changed its way of approaching problems.13  In the Taiwan Strait problem, China started 
to take aggressive actions in the 1990s. However, it seemed to switch to a more moderate 
and peaceful position, along with its “new security strategy in mid-1990.”14 
David Shambaugh comments that the changes in China’s security policy reduced 
the potential for total war in Northeast Asia, but they also created other concerns for 
South Korea.  China’s security re-evaluation caused China to alter its military goals, from 
defending China under total war to defending China under conditions of a regional 
conflict.15  This change reduced the threat of major war, but also forced South Korea to 
become concerned simultaneously both with the DPRK threat and with China’s military 
modernization because China is defending its security in new and different ways.  Put in 
other words, South Korea’s new concern is that China’s security policy of “active 
defense”16 raises the (new) possibility of a regional conflict, which may more easily 
occur than a total war.  This possibility may pose concerns to South Korea.   
                                                 
12 Mel Gurtov and Byong-moo Hwang, China’s Security: The New Roles of the Military Boulder 
(Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 63; David Shambaugh. Modernizing China’s  Military: Progress, 
Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2003), 64–65.  
13 Tae Hwan Lee, “U.S., China, and Peace Building on the Korean Peninsula,” Sejong Policy Studies, 
vol. 5, no. 1 (2009): 6–7. 
14 Ling Xing-guang, “China’s New Peace Strategy,” The Japan Times, November 18, 2002, 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20021118a1.html (accessed May 13, 2009). 
15 David Shambaugh. Modernizing China’s  Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley, 
California: University of California Press, 2003), 66–69. 
16 Ibid., 62–63. 
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Also, in Taeho Kim’s argument, if a regional conflict occurs with U.S. 
intervention, then South Korea has to pick a side. This creates a loss for South Korea 
when making any choice.  Additionally, if the United States seeks to use U.S. forces 
stationed on the Korean peninsula for other conflicts, then the DPRK threat to South 
Korea would become more significant.17 
On the other hand, China’s security strategy change may be interpreted as seeking 
peaceful resolution of disputes and reducing the probability of military conflict in the 
region. This would also mean that China may not create conflicts that would draw United 
States’ intervention.  However, this is uncertain and the possibility of conflict between 
China and the United States still exists.   
Bill Gertz suggests that there are reasons why, in the long run, conflict is more 
likely to occur.18  The decrease of United States influence in Northeast Asia, 
accompanying the emergence of China is one such factor that has been emphasized.19  
Therefore, the possibility of a Sino-U.S. conflict, despite economic relations, still exists 
in the longer term, and South Korea should be prepared and factor the possibility of 
conflict into its security policy. 
3. The South Korean Perspective on the United States 
The United States has contributed a great deal to the present status of South 
Korea.  At the end of World War II, the independence of the Korean peninsula from 
Japanese colonization was an outcome of the Allied victory over Japan.  After 
independence, however, the creation of the North and South Korean states on the Korean 
peninsula was also the product of the Cold War between Moscow and Washington.   
                                                 
17 Taeho Kim, “The Costs of China’s Military Conflict: The Korean and Japanese Dimensions,” in 
Andrew Scobell ed., The costs of conflict: The impact on China of a Future War (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, United States Army War College, October, 2001), 63–75. 
18 Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People’s Republic Targets America (New York: Regnery 
Publishing, Inc., 2000), 184. 
19 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2004 Report to Congress of the U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review commission (One Hundred Eighth Congress, Second Session, June 
2004), 28–34, http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2004/04annual_report.pdf (accessed May 10, 2009). 
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The Korean War was certainly a major war of the Cold War era as well.  In fact, 
that war technically continues to this day.  Technically, the Korean War is not over yet—
there is only an armistice. The armistice was set up with the agreement of China, the 
Soviet Union, the DPRK, and the United States under the Military Armistice 
Commission. 
The current South Korean prosperity could not have been achieved without the 
support of the United States in economic and military aid.  Therefore, U.S. strategic 
interests and security policy are very important factors in South Korean security policy.  
Jae Ho Chung notes, on the other hand, that the support of the United States to South 
Korea also may pose a dilemma for South Korea when the interests of the two nations are 
not the same, especially when considering China.20  This conclusion has many aspects to 
consider.   
James Goodby states that the strategic purpose of the United States on the Korean 
peninsula is the denuclearization, or elimination of the North Korean nuclear proliferation 
threat and construction of peaceful stability in the region without conflicts in the 
peninsula.21  Along with increase of Japanese security and the strengthening of South 
Korean-United States alliances, Christopher R. Hill notes that the United States intends to 
use a cooperative relationship through Six-Party Talks on Northeast Asia peace and 
security mechanisms.22  However, the interests and the role of China in such a situation 
have not been described, nor has consideration been given to China’s capability and 
influence on the Korean peninsula.  
China’s intentions regarding how and to what extent it will pursue its own 
interests in the region regarding this issue are muted, or not explicitly declared.  
                                                 
20 Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 92–102. 
21 Donald Gross and James Goodby, “A Framework for Peace and Security in Korea and Northeast 
Asia: Report of the Atlantic Council Working Group on North Korea,” The Atlantic Council of the United 
States, Policy Paper (April 2007), 11–12, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/07032ACNKR.pdf  
(accessed October 29, 2009). 
22 Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary of State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Status of the Six-Party Talks for the Denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula,” February 6, 2008, http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2008/HillTestimony080206a.pdf 
(accessed May 15, 2009). 
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Therefore, the possibility of collapse of the cooperative form of work between the United 
States and China on the Korean peninsula exists.  Taeho Kim mentions that, additionally, 
other potential conflicts between the United States and China in the Taiwan Strait, the 
Senkaku Islands, or the South China Sea may undermine cooperation on the Korean 
peninsula.23   
Considering the economic role of China in the South Korean economy and also 
the importance of the United States in South Korea, Taeho Kim concludes that the above 
conditions may present hard choices for South Korea to make.24  
4. Recent PLA Modernization 
The possibility of China challenging the United States in a manner that 
undermines the security of South Korea is plausible in light of PLA modernization.  
According to a 2004 report to Congress, the United States security policy in Northeast 
Asia region is to maintain its influences; in contrast to this, China’s intention in the long 
term, is to negate the influence of the United States in the region.25  
The PLA modernization in recent years has certain trends: high-tech, efficient, 
power projection capability, and rapid action.  These are core evidences of a developing 
military capable of being used in a power projection role in peripheral regional conflicts 
in order to protect its national interests.  Even if China does not have any intention to use 
its military to coerce neighboring nations, as Avery Goldstein argues,26 China’s strategy 
is not transparent and its military developments can create doubts of China’s intentions 
toward other nations.  Additionally, its national interests could change or shift in favor of 
a forceful policy, especially if the military is capable enough to execute the missions.  
                                                 
23 Taeho Kim, “The Costs of China’s Military Conflict: The Korean and Japanese Dimensions,” in 
Andrew Scobell ed., The costs of conflict: The impact on China of a Future War (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, United States Army War College, October, 2001), 66. 
24 Ibid., 64–74. 
25 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2004 Report to Congress of the U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review commission (One Hundred Eighth Congress, Second Session, June 
2004), 1–2, http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2004/04annual_report.pdf (accessed May 10, 2009).   
26 Avery Goldstein, “An emerging China’s emerging Grand Strategy: A Neo-Bismaarckian Turn.” in 
G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno ed., International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 72–73. 
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Over the years, China has steadily reduced its forces, however, that reduction in 
the size of the PLA is not necessarily related to China’s claims of peaceful intentions.  
The reduction was implemented mainly in the PLA Army and was approximately 20 
percent over three years.27  The reduction in the PLA Army, on one hand, may be 
interpreted as a peaceful action, but additional, more detailed, information on the 
modernization of the PLA Navy and Air Force, suggests that such a view might be hasty.  
Bates Gill notes that the PLA Navy and Air Force, in fact, are not reducing.  They are 
modernizing with a focus or an effort to increase their capabilities and develop 
independent technology.28 
                                                 
27 Jane’s Defense Weekly, “Army Seeks Mobility in Force Cuts,” vol. 30, issue 24, December 16, 
1998 (accessed October 11, 2009). 
28 Bates Gill, “Chinese Military Modernization and Arms Proliferation in the Asia-Pacific”.  In 
Pollack, Jonathan and Yang, Richard H. ed., Conference Proceedings In China’s Shadow: Regional 
Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 1998), 24. 
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II. PLA MODERNIZATION 
Since the leadership and reform era of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, there has 
been no doubt among professional China watchers that China has been trying to reshape 
and reform its military weapons and equipment and other areas.29  This chapter will 
overview what has changed and what goals China could be trying to achieve through the 
reform. Reviewing such changes might provide answers or clues or identifying the 
implications of PLA modernization and the security of other neighboring nations.   
This paper will start by evaluating the domestic political and external security 
context for the changes in doctrine of the PLA ground, maritime, and air forces.  
Accumulation of various aspects of military modernization in these areas may provide the 
goal of where China is headed, or what could be its intent.   
This question does not center on whether China has attempted to acquire a greater 
offensive capability or new defensive capability.  If neighboring nations feel threatened 
and interpret such modernizations as offensive posturing, then the original intention of 
the PRC loses much of its significance.  Therefore, the proper question might be whether 
or not PLA modernization, as a whole, may be interpreted as offensive to others.  One of 
the military aspects that stands out in this regard is the capability to execute offensive 
operations or power projection. 
Among analysts of China, there is consensus that the PLA ground force is 
reducing its numbers, while acquiring modernized military equipment, assets, and 
developing an operational doctrine capable of not only rapid and effective reaction to a 
conflict, but also the ability to project into a regional battle theater near its borders, 
despite the vast size of China’s mainland.  The PLA maritime force seeks to obtain power 
projection capability through new assets such as (an) aircraft carrier, plus blue ocean 
naval assets with longer operational ranges.  The PLA Air Force also is working to  
 
 
                                                 
29 Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army After Mao (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 47–148. 
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extend its operational range by using aerial refueling aircraft.  The PLA’s modernization 
seems to heading conclusively toward a more aggressive or even threatening position to 
neighboring nations. 
A. DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES 
Prosperity of a nation depends on its goals and national interests.  These national 
interests may depend, in turn, upon on that nation’s long-term vision and even its national 
security and strategy.  Security and strategy objectives for a nation may be influenced or 
even formed by threat(s) that are external and imposed by external condition upon the 
country.  In addition, the perception of threats also can shape a nation’s security and 
strategy.  Its National Defense Policy, to deal with threats and protect the security of that 
nation, should be related to these factors.  Although these factors are important, actual 
decisions by national leaders are seldom so focused.  National security assessments and 
actions are made by leaders, by people who work inside of a national framework that 
includes a process with systemic procedures and politics.  Therefore, defense 
modernization is deeply correlated with domestic politics as well as external security 
threats. 
1. Domestic Influence 
From the beginning of the PRC, Mao had to struggle for legitimacy of the 
Communist Party in China and had to manage economic development under socialist 
ideology after the establishment of the Communist Party.  Throughout his leadership, at 
least part of Mao’s motivation was his need to maintain his agenda and authority in China 
by formulating a revolutionary society.  Therefore, the PLA’s underlying or foundational 
concept is its struggle with deficiencies and its focus on the human factor rather than 
weaponry or equipment.  Under this approach, changes or modernizations to China’s 
defense capability were not only viewed as a burden, and with constraints; but also were 
seen as a generally unfavorable solution.  In considering the capability of China during 
Mao’s era, the “people’s war” concept may be understood in that context—that is, it was 
the only option for Mao to legitimize and justify his authority. 
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At the end of Mao’s leadership and the beginning of Deng’s period, the transition 
period itself made it harder for the PLA to modernize.  This was due in part to the radical 
leaders’ intervention in military affairs for domestic political reasons.  Joffe writes, for 
example, that “the ‘gang of four’ was similarly condemned for undermining the combat 
readiness of the armed forces.”30  In other words, radical political leaders were against 
defense modernization.  These political struggles created a lag in modernization and 
coerced the PLA to retain Mao’s thoughts.  Therefore, now the PLA had to confront not 
only a financial struggle but also political struggles and justification for military 
modernization.     
Later, of necessity, defense modernization started to gain support.  Joffe uses Su 
Yu’s new term by providing evidence of movement in the PRC, “Which introduced the 
term ‘people’s war under modern conditions.’ ” Although ostensibly an exposition of 
‘people’s war’, the ulterior motive of the article was clearly to stress the need for modern 
strategy and tactics.”31  However, Deng mitigated such political struggles and 
circumspection.  Deng’s argument, “seek truth from facts,” allowed him and military 
leaders to resolve the issue ingeniously.  As illustrated by Joffe: “Deng thus sanctioned 
the revision of Maoist doctrine without repudiating Mao, a sanction which gained added 
force after he consolidated his supremacy at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central 
Committee in December 1978.”32 
Deng’s successors maintained Mao’s legacy as well as promoted defense 
modernization.  Moreover, there is no doubt that the PLA continues modernizing even 
today.  However, the problem was not so much in domestic political justification or 
power struggles.  Mainly it was the lack of a defense industry and infrastructure, and 
economic limitations.  However, there are many other important factors that have 
influenced PLA modernization, positively and negatively. 
                                                 
30 Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army After Mao (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 75. 
31 Ibid., 77. 
32 Ibid., 78. 
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Domestic influences, mainly in the political realm, made it hard for Mao’s 
successors to react effectively to the development of modern militaries internationally.  
Economic capabilities and constraints, of course, were a major excuse, but disregard for 
domestic political struggles along with maintaining the legacy of Mao did have a severely 
negative influence on the timing of the PLA’s modernization.  Mao’s successor, Deng, 
and his successors, have been focusing on economics and China’s defense capabilities.  
The effort has been slow, but to be sure, the modernization is moving forward, or at least 
looking forward to certain goals. 
2. External Influence 
It is a tit-for-tat and rational reaction that states to prepare an adequate capability 
to counterbalance any threat to which that the state is exposed.  With the same logic, 
considering or correlating China’s defense modernization to a potential external security 
threat is quite convincing.  In the previous section, domestic changes fostered by the 
political leaders of China were discussed.  In this section, external influences will be 
considered.  This section will provide the underlying purpose for why China is 
modernizing its defense sector. 
In the early stages of China under Mao, the country enjoyed relatively vast 
amounts of aid from the Soviet Union.  As the relationship and the interests of the two 
nations changed, so did subsequent security threat analyses by China.  It had to confront 
both the Soviet Union and the United States.  Therefore, in spite of the withdrawal of 
Soviet aid on its nuclear program, China focused even harder to acquire a nuclear arsenal.  
Initially, China’s nuclear possession was to deter a Soviet attack on the mainland by 
massive numbers of conventional forces or even by a possible nuclear attack.   
In the 1970s, these conditions shifted and there was a decrease in the possibility 
of using massive force total war.  Especially, the possibility of using nuclear weapons in 
any Sino-Soviet confrontation, and moreover, the prospect for any battle seemed to grow 
more unlikely.  As a result, China reevaluated its security threat, shifting from an 
imminent Soviet attack on its border with a massive attack to a local war threatened by 
varying opponents.   
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In the 1980s, the relationship between the Soviet Union and China experienced a 
rapprochement.  As a result, the possibility of conflict on the Soviet-Sino border was 
greatly reduced.  Additionally, the Soviet Union’s support on technology and arms sales 
was reinvigorated, at least when compared to the “frozen time” in the relationship.  In 
addition, after the Tiananmen crisis, China lost many Western partners, but the Soviet 
Union maintained the relationship.  In other words, the Soviet Union became China’s 
only (or at least best) major power “friend” again, for quite some time.  Throughout the 
Post-Cold War era, China even maintained a positive relationship with The Russian 
Federation, successor to the Soviet Union.  This relationship with the Soviet Union and 
its successor caused both restrictions and support for China.  The PLA became noticeably 
dependent on Soviet defense technology and military doctrine.  This dependency 
ultimately caused China to alter its defense modernization approach again after the Gulf 
War. 
In the Gulf War, the United States demonstrated high tech weaponry and 
equipment used as assets for implementing information warfare based operations and 
strategy.  Such war was swift and decisive.  China was stunned and felt the necessity for 
even an even more and better “leapfrog” of its defense modernization.   
The overarching problem of China on its defense modernization is the lack of 
budget and antiquated human resources, weapons, equipment, and doctrine that require to 
modernization.  The relationships and threats posed by the Soviet Union and the United 
States first let China, under Mao, adhere to an obsolete military.  Later, Soviet aid also 
lacking in cutting edge stage military performance, demonstrated by the United States in 
the Gulf War, led China to change its goal once again.  Therefore, China’s defense 
modernization has been taking much longer than expected due to   other factors of 
limitations.     
B. CHANGE IN DOCTRINE 
It is constructive to review exactly what the goals or purposes of doctrine are—to 
understand how doctrine might be changed, and what effect that might have.  Dr. Paul H. 
B. Godwin defines doctrine by stating, “Doctrine consists of the fundamental principles 
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guiding those who plan the use of military forces.” In his article, Godwin argues that 
doctrine, strategy, and operation are closely linked and influence each other.  Therefore, 
he says, “Operational doctrine consists of the principles guiding the use of military forces 
to conduct the operations.  For the past two decades, Chinese military journals have 
focused primarily on analyses of operational doctrine.” 33 
1. People’s War 
The PLA has confronted the requirement for changes in military doctrine to 
(strategic and operational doctrine), as well as in weapons and in equipment since the 
founding of China’s Communist Government in 1949.34  According to Ellis Joffe, the 
political nature of retirements during the people’s war period “obviated the need for 
urgent preparations to defend the mainland against an impending invasion by a greatly 
superior force. … It saw little utility in retaining principles and practices which were 
designed to counterbalance technological inferiority.”35  Mao’s military doctrine with the 
“people’s war” in simple terms, was human power before material.  At the same time, 
this approach sought to fit the reality of China’s situation at that time.  Without sufficient 
financial support, technical and material resources notably, modernization was hard to 
accomplish.  Additionally, the security context at that time did not let China’s military 
doctrine evolve from a focus on preparations for a full-scale war, to a different, or, next 
strategic stage.  Therefore, the “people’s war,” with the focus on human power and the 
objective of luring an enemy to fight (if a fight were inevitable) on the mainland, 
provided China with certain advantages and might even have been the best option that 
Mao could implement. 
Mao Tse Dong, his legacy, and even the PLA military doctrine he promulgated, 
evolved as Deng Xiaoping finally emerged as Mao’s successor.  Gao, Guozhen wrote; 
“After the mid-1980s, as the international strategic situation evolved and changed, the 
                                                 
33 Paul Godwin, “Compensating for Deficiencies: Doctrinal Evolution in the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army,” in James C. Mulvenon, Andrew N. D. Yang, Seeking Truth From Facts: A 
Retrospective on Chinese Military Studies in the Post-Mao Era (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2001), 
89. 
34 Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army After Mao (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 71. 
35 Ibid., 71. 
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CPC Central Committee came up with a new assessment of war and peace.  China 
adjusted its military strategy and operational doctrine research also shifted from total 
warfare to limited warfare.”36  Furthermore, Godwin articulates that “in the fall of 1979, 
… the PLA’s poor performance in Vietnam earlier that year” 37 stimulated the necessity 
of a new assessment.  The new doctrine was ‘People’s war under modern conditions” and 
“Limited and local war.” 
2. People’s War under Modern Conditions 
Domestically, or internally speaking, China’s “People’s war under modern 
conditions” dealt with regime legitimacy. The justification of the new assessment would 
ensure Mao’s legacy being embedded in the Central Military Commission and Chinese 
policy yet bring modern conditions of war into the PLA’s consideration.  More 
importantly, however, it was a rational decision and movement to change the PLA to 
make it better able to deal with the changing contemporary security conditions.  In this 
regard, Burles and Shulsky specify that the “’people’s war under modern conditions’ was 
intended to address the security challenges posed by the possibility of a Soviet attack 
across China’s northern border.”38  They also note “ ‘People’s war under modern 
conditions’ was also intended to provide the PLA with an alternative method for dealing 
with future security threats that fell short of a general invasion.”39  An additional reason 
for the “People’s war under modern conditions,” cited by Burles and Shulsky, was the 
necessity to protect key economic and industrial specialized areas against possible 
enemy, (i.e., Soviet) attacks.  Therefore, preparing to defend such areas against possible 
enemies with faster, longer, and more destructive weapons and tactics was essential for 
the PLA.  The PLA, at least, had to invest in catching up with modern conditions.  
                                                 
36 Guozhen Gao & Zheng Ye, “PLA operational doctrine since 1980s,” 中国军事科学 (Chinese 
Military Science), 20 Nov 1996. 
37 Paul Godwin, “Compensating for Deficiencies: Doctrinal Evolution in the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army,” in James C. Mulvenon, Andrew N. D. Yang, Seeking Truth From Facts: A Retrospective 
on Chinese Military Studies in the Post-Mao Era (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2001), 91. 
38 Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, Patterns in China’s Use of Force: Evidence from History and 
Doctrinal Writings (Washington D.C.: RAND, 2000), 26, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1160.pdf (accessed October 12, 2009). 
39 Ibid., 27. 
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Finally, Burles and Shulsky mention the importance of the initial stage of conflict, since 
on the tactical level, modernized weapons make the initial stage of war far more critical 
and decisive when compared with the past.40 
3. Limited and Local War 
The limited war doctrine was driven by external security threat changes and the 
actual conditions or capabilities of the PLA.  Nan Li states “The assumption of an 
inevitable global war that would pit China against the Soviet Union had remained 
constant from the late 1960s to the first half of the 1980s.  This assumption, however, 
was jettisoned in 1985 with the adoption of a new strategic calculus by the Central 
Military Commission (CMC).”41  Deficiencies in technology and defense industry 
infrastructure, as well as budget constraints, were still retarding conditions for 
modernization.  Therefore, the second phase of China’s military doctrine and concepts of 
operation was revised, based on a limited war concept.   
The limited war strategy shifted the PLA thinking from “’early war, major war 
and nuclear war’ to the track of ‘peacetime army building.’”42  For the PLA, this change 
meant a change in the “nature of war”43 with dramatic and distinctive changes in the 
content of war viewed using the “local war” concept.  “Local war,” in Nan Li’s 
perspective, focused first on political and diplomatic factors such as mediation and 
possible constraints to military actions.  Second, was the introduction of the idea of 
limited objectives in war, not simply the complete annihilation of an adversary, but 
rather, “enhancing diplomatic initiatives, intimidating the enemy psychology and 
acquiring economic resources.” Concurrently, local war generally would be conducted in 
a controlled area and for a limited duration.  Under this strategy, the use of force or 
                                                 
40 Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, Patterns in China’s Use of Force: Evidence from History and 
Doctrinal Writings (Washington D.C.: RAND, 2000), 28–29, 
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41 Nan Li, “The PLA’s Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, 1985–1995: A Chinese 
Perspective,” in David Shambaugh and Richard Yang, ed., China’s Military in Transition (New York: 
Oxford University Press, Inc., 1997), 181. 
42 Ibid., 181. 
43 Ibid., 182.  
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military operations may be limited further by consideration or influences of the 
international community and by other domestic political decisions; therefore, it sought to 
avoid escalation of a military action into a bigger or a larger scale conflict.   
Nan Li notes that the strategic perspective for the strategy of “Limited and local 
war,” included the concepts of “strategic frontier,” “strategic deterrence,” “winning a 
victory through elite troops,” “gaining the initiative by striking first,” and “fight a quick 
battle to force a quick solution.”44  Such strategic principles presuppose or include 
assumptions that the PLA will seek to have military forces concentrated in more valuable 
or higher risk areas, and it will seek to develop more professional and better equipped 
military officers and soldiers, and that it will extend its active defense with troops capable 
of quick and decisive action.  In the scope of battlefield tactics, Nan Li uses “offensive 
verses offensive,” “defensive with offensive,” and “all in-depth” concepts.45  
Such concepts at the tactical level explains how the PLA is aiming for a military 
capability that is more offence-capable and includes tactics to cover the overall area of 
conflict without discriminating, particularly between the front and the rear areas of 
combat. Godwin also verifies “limited and local war” with several kinds of evidence.  He 
mentions five types of war listed in Jia Wenxian’s article, “Border Wars, conflicts over 
maritime territorial seas and territories, surprise air attacks, deliberately limited attacks 
into Chinese territory, and ‘punitive counter-attacks’ launched by China to ‘oppose 
invasion, protect sovereignty, or to uphold justice and dispel threats.’ ”46  The evidence 
Godwin mentions is four field exercises in 1988 that explain the PLA’s perspective on 
targeting its combat readiness.  “Three focused on the USSR as the potential adversary 
with exercises located in the Lanzhou, Beijing, and Shenyang MRs.  The fourth was 
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conducted in the Guangzhou MR, where the adversary was presumably Vietnam. … The 
exercise directed at Vietnam focused on both coastal defense and the protection of 
China’s territory in the South China Sea.”47   
By using forces titled as “fists” and “rapid response,” and by ordering operating 
responsibilities as “door openers,” scalpels, “steel hammers,” and “booster,” Godwin 
argues that the “PLA’s moving toward using elite units in the opening phase of a conflict.  
Such units would be small, but better trained and equipped than the majority of the PLA. 
Another indicator of PLA planners’ move toward more flexible, quick-reacting forces 
and away from mass armies as the source of military power.”48 The local and limited war 
concept has conclusively realigned PLA goals to become a more concentrated, offensive, 
quick, and destructive force. 
On the other hand, Gurtov’s and Hwang’s description of the PLA’s “limited and 
local war” is rather toned down.  Their main argument supposes “Chinese analysts insist 
that their theory of modern limited war is based on the strategic guidance of active 
defense, in particular, the strategic guidance that in a limited war, one adheres to the 
principle of ‘gaining mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck.’ … Thus, say 
Chinese analysts, the strategy is reasonable and restrained, a backup for and instrument of 
the PRC’s peaceful foreign policy.” 49   Later, they write “Indeed, what the Chinese 
leadership mostly seems to desire is to be free from outside pressure and blackmail and to 
ensure that if China is ever again subjected to subversion and invasion, it will be able to 
strike back with devastating effectiveness.”50  Gurtov’s and Hwang’s argument discounts 
the fact that limited and local war, with faster, flexible, and more destructive weapons, 
requires only a short period of time to shift from the original “people’s war” doctrine and 
can adapt to real-time tactical and strategic condition changes.   
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The PLA’s modernization may be interpreted as a reasonable development of a 
military capability to match its neighboring nations capabilities, as suggested by Gurtov’s 
and Hwang, but contrary points of view, with less benign interpretations, also should be 
considered in any evaluation of PLA modernization. 
4. Limited and Local War under High-tech Conditions 
Military doctrine and operations demonstrated by the United States during the 
Gulf War opened China’s eyes to modern high-tech based military action; countless 
Chinese and Western military analysts acknowledge that this inspired the concept of 
“local war under high tech conditions.”  Such stimulation and awakening have 
encouraged the PLA to integrate multi-service combined-arms operations’ tactics and to 
pursue an extended active defense doctrine of military actions.  Furthermore, it 
accelerated the acquisition of more advanced weapons and equipment and generated 
leadership support for information and effects-based operations capability.  Such new 
capabilities would enhance the elements introduced earlier under limited and local war 
concepts: concentrated, offensive, quick, and destructive capability that would allow the 
PLA to take decisive and initiative actions when the use of military is required. 
In “Lessons of the Gulf War” Nan Li writes, “The Gulf War of 1991 served to 
eliminate the lingering doubts among the Chinese strategic planners on introducing the 
new limited war doctrine, principles and tactics, and has reinforced and accelerated 
China’s push to modernize its military.… to involve ‘new fighting styles,’ to be high-
tech, non-nuclear (but under nuclear deterrence), and resolved quickly.”51  As a result, 
Nan Li argues that the Gulf war forced the PLA to recognize element of modern, local 
war.  In strategic principle, Nan Li argues that the Gulf War validated the principles of 
“victory through elite troops,” “victory over inferiority through superiority,” and 
“fighting a quick battle to gain quick solution,” for the PLA.52  The Gulf War further 
promoted a re-evaluation of “a strike only after the enemy has struck” perspective and 
                                                 
51 Nan Li, “The PLA’s Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, 1985–1995: A Chinese 
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resulted in a change to “gaining initiative by striking firs,”  in other words, “pre-emptive 
strike.”53  Additionally, Li identifies the PLA’s development, and the de-valuation of the 
earlier approach of the importance of manpower-based hardware; he states that this was 
due to the recognition of importance of high-tech weapon systems which include 
intelligence, air defense, multi-function air combat arms, early warning, C3I system, 
satellites, precision guided munitions, and modern logistics.54  Nan Li sums up the result 
of the Gulf War on the PLA as follows; “lessons learned from the Gulf War have largely 
eliminated the lingering doubts among the Chinese strategic planners over the 
introduction of the new doctrine, strategic principles and operational tactics, and has 
reinforced the current trend for more comprehensive defense modernization.”55 
An additional lesson that the PLA learned from Gulf War was the effectiveness of 
high-tech joint operations.  Godwin discusses that “The role of high-technology arms and 
supporting systems in Operation Desert Strom essentially confirmed earlier conclusions 
drawn by Chinese analysts evaluating the history of military operations in local, limited 
wars.  What stunned … was the effectiveness of high-technology joint operations.”  This 
effectiveness in joint operations was identified in two aspects in particular, first in air 
operations and second in synergic multi-service actions synchronized with the ground 
war resulting in rapid and decisive outcomes.  In other words, the Gulf War led the PLA 
to realize that not only were its weapons and equipment aspects outdated, but also its 
operational doctrine was antiquated as well.56   
The PLA’s main conclusion from its analyses of limited war before the Gulf War 
was its realization of a need to change to a modern war concept.  The subsequent 
conclusions that the PLA made, post Gulf War, moved far beyond this basic concept with 
the realization of the details and concepts they needed to emphasize in the future.  
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Godwin adds, “PLA researchers paid considerable attention to air operations.”  
Additionally, he notes (PLA General) Liu’s comment stating, “General Liu, however, did 
set priorities.  Resources were focused on air and naval forces because war on land and 
sea can no longer be won without effective air power and because China’s extensive 
coastline and maritime territories required an effective navy.”57  Godwin’s arguments 
underscore the point that the PLA was intent on developing a more capable Navy that 
would be capable of projecting its power in support of extended active defense.  In his 
conclusion, Godwin, notes that the PLA realized its deficiencies and aimed at acquiring a 
better military, which would be capable of power projection in an extended operational 
area, all this to be done within local and limited war aspect. 
5. Conclusion 
Doctrinal change in the PLA argued by the professional literature confirms that 
the PLA opened its eyes to cutting-edge concepts of warfighting as executed by the 
world’s great power and advanced nations.  The PLA also realized what it required to 
bridge the gap and to catch-up.  Details of such efforts will follow in the next section.  
Today, China, even while facing many obstacles, continues the process of acquiring 
necessary military elements to narrowing this gap.  There are some significant or relevant 
concepts that may be inferred from such a progressive processes including that as long as 
domestic politics and economic conditions are sufficient, the PLA will possess an 
effective military that is capable of ensuring China’s national interests with a more 
aggressive concept of military actions.  A nation that has overwhelming military 
capability may be interpreted as being a potential threat to other nations, especially those 
with less capable militaries.  One possible condition that may mitigate such tensions or 
threats could be extensive security building measures and third party participation to 
balance these conditions, possibly as suggested in pivotal deterrence theory.58 
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C. PLA-GROUND, PLA-MARITIME, AND PLA-AIR FORCE 
This section will outline the scope of possible threats by considering the quality 
and quantity of PLA forces.  The current capability of the PLA will also be considered 
and the likely or possible range of PLA operations will be inferred from the development 
of these forces. The nominal premise in this part of the thesis is that, for the PLA in 
general, the number of its forces have been reduced but the quality of the remaining 
forces has either been improved, or is in the process of being improved. Such a 
comprehensive force change for the PLA, drives a logical or inescapable conclusion that 
security planners in Northeast Asia must consider that an aggressive military policy could 
now be implemented—especially if a coercive solution would be required for the best 
interest of China.  
1. PLA Ground Force 
a. Strategic Paradigm 
The PLA Ground Forces’ overall change in strategic paradigm coincides 
with a PLA doctrinal change of PLA modernization.  Ground forces have improved in 
quality and been reduced in quantity, and are quicker, more effective, more decisive, and 
more capable of conducting information-based operations with high technology weapons. 
They are better versed in operations with joint services, even while their operational 
doctrine remains focused on ground operations.  This strong force on ground operations, 
even while working with air assets, may let analysts conclude that relative to PLAN and 
PLAAF, the changes in ground forces may seem limited. 
b. Size 
Godwin depicts the change in quantity for the PLA ground forces.  The 
quantity of manpower has been reduced from 2,973,000 in 1985 to 2,200,000 in 1995.  
Field Armies disappeared and Group Armies were re-organized.  The difference between 
the Field Army and the Group Army, according to Godwin, is that the Group Army is 
increasingly mechanized and has anti-air capability, in particular.  Furthermore, the PLA 
had seven helicopter groups organized by 1995.  An airborne division was maintained, 
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but nine Rapid Response Units also were established by 1995. In other words, PRC 
Ground Forces were modified to be faster and a stronger force by mechanization, but also 
better trained to recognize the effectiveness of air strikes.59 
c. Capability  
Although PLA ground forces did not have significant change relative to 
maritime and air forces. The ground force has improved its quality in accordance with 
PLA modernization policy. Paul H. B. Godwin suggests that with examples of the “’fist 
and the ‘fifth arm’ of the navy” the main effort of the PLA’s ground forces is 
concentrated on creating ‘fist’ and rapid response units (RRU).”  Due to the purpose 
represented in the name of the unit (RRU), airborne forces are especially important.  
Credible evidence presented by Godwin is “the 15th Group Army (Airborne) selected for 
training as ‘fist’ and rapid response units capable of being deployed anywhere in China 
within 24 hours.., and there are certainly additional units being prepared.”  His second 
evidence is in the area of amphibious warfare: [It is the] “fifth arm of the navy.”  The 
PLA Marine Corps were established in the early 1950s, disbanded once, but re-built 
again in 1980.   Godwin notes how the PLA Marine Corps has the mission for 
amphibious operations in the South China Sea region.  Additionally, they now have  a 
regular army force structure that has expanded to the size of three divisions. The PLA 
Marines still face a constraint on their operations in the area of mobility and delivery of 
assets.60     
d. Conclusion 
The modernization of PLA Ground Forces is focused on shaping a force 
that will acquire a fast and decisive capability while expanding its capability to uses 
aviation assets while it can provide a defense for aviation assets.  In other words, the 
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forces are pursuing a three-dimensional operational capability to succeed in achieving 
quick, decisive tactical goals.  On the strategic level, Mel Gurtov and Byong-moo Hwang 
suggest that the creation of such fast-acting, deployable forces may be interpreted as “the 
creation of China’s RRF (Rapid-Reaction Forces) and RDF (Rapid-Deployment Forces)” 
[and this] “may increase China’s ability to carry out active defense in such foreign 
environments as the Korean peninsula, the Indochina peninsula, the South Asian 
subcontinent, and Taiwan.”61  The enhanced amphibious capability, in particular, may 
represent a more active and perceived offensive capability for pre-emptive purposes. 
2. PLA Maritime Force: PLAN (PLA Navy) 
The PLAN, like the ground force, has changed its quality and quantity, to 
conform with the PLA modernization policy.  The new strategy has been applied to 
China’s strategic paradigm on where and how to use the PLAN.  Under the guidance or 
higher-level goals to become more aggressive and have a more capable military, China 
has been reforming the PLAN and transforming it from a costal force (“brown water”) to 
an offshore (“blue water”) capable military.   
a. Strategic Paradigm 
The context for PLAN modernization is the strategic paradigm of 
“Offshore Defense.”62  “Offshore Defense” is a component of the PLA’s “Active 
Defense” strategic guidelines.  Such defense follows several basic principles.  The 
noteworthy aspect of this principle is that it asserts “‘Overall, our military strategy is 
defensive.  We attack only after being attacked.  But our operations are offensive,’ 
‘Space or time will not limit our counter-offensives,’ ‘We will not put boundaries on the 
limits of our offensives.’”63  Those principles, despite the premise stating that the PLA 
would attack only when attacked, shows the potential and possibilities for the PLAN to 
execute extended operations for an unclear period of time and with offensive actions.  In 
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other words, it does not constrain the PLAN’s potential projection of power.  A report by 
the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence notes that the PLAN’s “Offshore Defense” extends 
its “operational reach” up to the “two island chain,” or 200-nautical-mile Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ).64   
Another important link suggesting insights into the PLAN’s intent is 
public PLAN writings about its campaign types.  According to the U.S. Office of Naval 
Intelligence, one of six key types of PLAN campaigns is the Sea-to-Land Attack 
Campaign.65  Based on the type of ships and forces in the Chinese Naval inventory, it is 
unlikely and unfeasible for the PLAN to conduct sea-to-land attack on targets in Europe, 
Africa, or the American continents, now and for the foreseeable future.  Therefore 
campaigns of the type mentioned in this strategy are likely to be targeted objectives in 
close vicinity of China. These could include: Southeast Asian nations, Taiwan, the 
Korean peninsula, and Japan.  It is particularly applicable to the island chains and 
archipelago in Northeast Asia that includes Japan, and also may relate to other areas 
including South Korea, Taiwan, and even the Philippines.  It is clear that the PLAN’s 
shift in its strategic paradigm and its development of naval campaign plans of this type 
suggest a potential security threat to China’s neighboring nations.    
b. Size and Capability 
The total number of personnel in PLAN was reduced from 350,000 in 
1985 to 260,000 in 1995.66  However, the number of PLAN ships has been increased, 
especially those which are high-tech based, or with extended operational capabilities, and 
supportive of (at least) regional power projection.  At the same time, old PLAN assets 
have been retired and replaced with newer ones.  The PLAN overall “has focused on 
                                                 
64 Office of Naval Intelligence, China’s Navy 2007, Ch 4, 26, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/oni/chinanavy2007.pdf (accessed September 10, 2009). 
65 Ibid., 23–30, 27. 
66 Paul H. B. Godwin , “From Continent to Periphery: PLA Doctrine, Strategy and Capabilities 
towards 2000,” The China Quarterly, no. 146, Special Issue: China’s Military in Transition (Cambridge 
University Press, Jun. 1996), Table 1. PRC Naval Forces 1985–95 (Major Combatants) and Focused 
Modernization Naval forces section, 474–478, 
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/pdfplus/655477.pdf or http://www.jstor.org/stable/655477 
(accessed October 2, 2009). 
 30
amphibious warfare and naval operations requiring replenishment-at-sea (RAS).  Both 
types of operations illustrate Beijing’s desire to extend its navy’s combat capabilities 
beyond coastal defense. As Table 1 demonstrates, China’s naval programs have focused 
on extending their operational range beyond coastal defense, including amphibious and 
submarine warfare.”   
Godwin offers some tangible evidence of PLAN modernization including:  
“two new classes of surface combatants, the 4,500-ton Luhu-class (type 052) guided 
missile destroyer (DDG) and the 2,750-ton Jiangwei-class (type 055) guided missile 
frigate (FFG), replenishment-at-sea capabilities, amphibious warfare ships, and 
improving submarine warfare capabilities through the purchase of Kilo-class diesel-
electric submarines (SSK) from Russia and developing a new Chinese designed SSK–the 
Song-class now undergoing sea-trials.”67  Acquisition of a French Crotale surface-to-air 
missile (SAM) system, French Exocet-based C801 ship-to-ship missile (SSM), Italian 
torpedo launchers and French Dauphin-2-based Z-9A helicopters shows the intention of 
enhancing PLAN surface and anti-subsurface combat operational capability.   
The PLAN increased its number of Oilers (AO) and store ships (AK) in 
order to enhance RAS.  The following data backed Godwin’s argument, “new 11,000-ton 
Dayun-class AK carrying two Super Frelon SA-321 helicopters for vertical 
replenishment” acquired by PLAN in 1995.68   
For amphibious warfare, Godwin also stated, “new classes of troop 
transport and amphibious landing vessels have been constructed in the last decade in an 
effort to enhance the PLA’s capabilities within China’s immediate waters and the South 
China Sea.”69  Evidence of newer amphibious warfare capability in Godwin’s argument 
is Yukan and Yuting-class LST. 
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Change in the submarine force in PLAN also follows this trend. As noted 
by Godwin, the PLAN has decommissioned 50 percent of its forces and a modernized 
process has been implemented on the remaining forces.  According to Godwin,  PLAN 
initially put its efforts into the development of nuclear powered submarines.  However, 
he expects that PLAN has encountered many difficulties in technology and budgets; 
therefore, current PLAN is focusing on diesel-powered submarines that also provide 
significant enough sea power.70   
Ellis Joffe states that, “the number of ships is estimated to have increased 
enormously since about 1970.71  The conventional submarine force has tripled from 
thirty-five to 100 vessels; over thirty-five guided-missile destroyers and frigates have 
been commissioned; at least one nuclear powered missile submarine and two nuclear-
powered attack submarines have been placed in service; various auxiliary vessels, 
including long-range supply ships, have been built.”  Joffe also identifies the purpose of 
such an increase of PLAN in an interview with Liu Huaqing, the assistant chief of staff of 
the PLA, who has significantly influenced the modernization of the navy.  At the time (in 
1985) Liu Huaqing’s stated, “China has a coastline of more than 18,000 kilometers, more 
than 6,000 islands and an expanse of ocean spanning 3.5 million square kilometers.  To 
protect its coast and maritime interests, China attaches great importance to developing the 
navy, and this ‘includes the emphatic development of its submarine force’, whose 
essential characteristics are concealment, endurance, self-supporting capability, and 
striking strength.…submarine operations were limited to coastal water, but now they 
extend to the sea areas of the western Pacific and the far-off islands.” 
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c. Aircraft Carrier 
In addition to the naval assets described above, PLAN’s process of 
acquiring an aircraft carrier has been a “hot” issue.72  Regarding aircraft carrier(s), Liu 
Huaqing also played a great role.  According to Liu (as reiterated by Ian Storey and You 
Ji), PLAN doctrine will be upgraded through two conceptual phases.  The first was 
“green-water active defense” and the second is “blue water navy” where the PLAN will 
be capable of projecting China’s power to the Western Pacific. Storey and You write, 
“Liu believed that in order to fulfill a blue-water capability, the PLAN had to obtain 
aircraft carriers.”  Liu’s argument that aircraft carriers are essential to protect China’s 
sovereignty as related to the Taiwan issue and for maritime interests that mainly are 
resources and sea line of communication (SLOC) related territorial security issues.  In 
order to maintain and secure such interests, the PLAN should work to gain a decisive 
edge in future naval warfare, and an aircraft carrier would play a significant role in this 
(according to Liu in Storey and You).   
Currently the PLAN is focusing on “two combat models: the first is the 
independent employment of naval power, and the second is that of joint operations with 
other services, particularly the army.”73  Storey and You conclude, “Ultimately, though, 
the (PLAN) goal is to fulfill the first model,” which is “the independent employment of 
naval power.”74  Storey and You argue that, in detail the objectives of PLAN (in 
accordance with previously discussed two combat models) are “sea control and sea 
denial.”  Furthermore, those objectives, in order to defend China— “the Bohai Sea Strait, 
the Taiwan Strait, and the Qiongzhou Strait” as the inner line of defense and the two 
island chains that span from “Japan to the Liuqi Islands, then to Taiwan and the 
Philippines” and “Japan’s Ogasawara-gunto Islands to the Marianas” as the outer layer of 
China’s maritime defense line. 
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Based on the preceding intentions, the PLAN has made owning an aircraft 
carrier a priority.  Efforts and processes to that end are still under way; however, these 
plans have altered the main effort of PLAN development a bit.  Since China’s primary 
security concern has focused on Taiwan independence, concerns and efforts to acquire an 
aircraft carrier have been moderated.75  While an aircraft carrier is considered an 
essential means to project PLAN power at great distance from China’s coast, Taiwan is 
relatively close and possible operations concerning Taiwan would be conducted within 
China’s inner defense line.  If the United States were to intervene, it could do so with 
forces of the U.S. Navy with aircraft carriers that wield enormous firepower.  For this 
reason, PLAN’s defense policy has shifted (or broadened) to focus on building a 
submarine force that is less vulnerable to enemy attack and less costly to maintain, and 
under certain conditions, even more cost effective in combat than an aircraft carrier with 
its support ships.   
China’s aircraft carrier development has been a big issue for the PLAN, 
but it has slipped in priority due to practical force-and-security considerations.  
Additionally, it suggests that PLAN leaders and strategists have calculated that directly 
opposing the U.S. Navy’s aircraft carrier battle group in the short term with its own 
nascent carrier force might not be effective and may border on an irrational approach.  
However, budget, time, and proper technologies plus continued PLAN leader interest in 
maritime power projection suggest that the PLAN is unlikely to abandon its decision to 
develop an aircraft carrier.  This is constantly reinforced by the continued PLA emphasis 
on amphibious operations and air force capability. Abolishing the goal of having an 
aircraft carrier that would be the peak asset for projecting power under these conditions 
seems unlikely.    
d. Conclusion 
Despite difficulties, the PLAN has focused on abandoning old and 
unnecessary assets and has focused on building stronger surface ships, anti-submarine 
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naval air assets, amphibious ships, and RAS capable ships and helicopters.  Such efforts 
provide better power projection, capability and range.  Even though, the current PLAN is 
more focused on its submarine force vice developing an aircraft carrier, its intentions are 
still in projecting its power at a distance from China’s mainland coastal line in the active 
defense concept.  Emphasis on amphibious assets, along with high-tech naval vessels and 
sea-based missiles shows the intentions or ambitions of China.  Additionally, since 
China’s military doctrine has included pre-emptive attack, the general assessment of the 
overall effect of PLAN modernization can logically appear threatening to other nations in 
the region.  Accordingly, Gurtov and Hwang state that “Nevertheless, the Beijing 
leadership probably considers a strengthened navy to be the ultimate guarantor of its 
claims.  Of particular importance is that China’s offshore active defense strategy bears 
directly on its behavior in the two unresolved sovereignty issues … Taiwan unification 
and the Spratly Islands.”76 
3. PLA Air Force (PLAAF)  
a. Doctrine 
China’s PLA Air Force (PLAAF)’s formal air defense strategy has not 
been openly or publicly stated.  Its missions are generally believed to be to conduct air 
defense and to support army and naval operations.  According to Kenneth W. Allen, 
“Although the PLAAF has conducted its primary mission of air defense for 45 years, the 
air force still does not have a formalized air defense strategy and probably will not have 
one in the foreseeable future.”77  The particular expression used by Gurtov and Hwang to 
describe the PLAAF’s strategy is “comprehensive strike in-depth strategy. … If an 
enemy’s aircraft intrudes into Chinese airspace, PLAAF will not only use all its air 
defense assets; it will carry out a counterattack deep inside the enemy’s territory.”78  
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Gurtov and Hwang also state that “A second view calls for crafting a rapid-reaction 
strategy. … The primary military requirements for rapid-reaction strategy are to 
strengthen intelligence and command and communications, and to organize rapid-
reaction units equivalent to those of foreign countries for coping with sudden, high-
intensity warfare” and “limited-space flexible response (youxian kongjian linghuo 
fanying).”79  Gurtov provides a third PLAAF strategy that is to be active within a certain 
operational area and to conform military actions to the political and strategic objectives 
decided by Chinas leaders.80 
b. Quantity and Quality 
As regards quantity, the PLAAF did not change as significantly as either 
the PLAN or the PLA Ground Force.  Comparing PLAAF manpower in 1985 and 1995, 
Godwin shows that the quantity reduced by only 20,000 men.  However, the number of 
newer fighters increased—especially SU-27s. Military reconnaissance aircraft including 
the JZ-5 and the JG-6 (MiG-17 and Mig-19 variants) were added.  Military lift or 
transport aircraft also were increased.  The acquisition of aerial tankers and the Chinese 
version of AWACS were not identified and were left unknown.81   
According to Allen, PLAAF documents published in 2000 show the 
changes in fighter platforms for the in PLAAF.  “By 2010, the PLAAF’s fighter force 
will most likely consist of between 1,500 and 2,000 aircraft, with almost the entire J-6s 
and early models J-7s retired.  The remaining force will consist of modified J-7s and J-8s.  
These aircraft will initially be complemented by and then replaced by the J-11 (Su-27), J-
10, and Su-30.”82  However, Godwin argues that the PLAAF’s efforts to obtain next level 
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fighter capability (enhanced third and new fourth generation fighters) is evidence of the 
PLA’s ambitious intent. “When combined with the PLAN’s efforts to improve its long-
range operational capabilities, the Su-27 is a clear indicator of Beijing’s intent.”83 
However, regarding the PLAAF’s modernization (especially in acquiring Su-27s), Gurtov 
and Hwang add the caveat that “only gradually is it likely to emerge as a decisive factor 
in the regional airpower equation.”84 
For aerial transports assets, it is generally believed by China watchers that 
the PLAAF is not fully equipped, but to some degree has been procuring aerial lift to 
support the PLA’s increased tempo and concepts of a rapid reaction strategy.85  The 
growing amphibious forces and airborne forces would require such lift in order to be 
brought into operations.  
An Airborne Early Warning (AEW) asset in PLAAF is yet another area in 
which the PLA is investing.  Regardless of how the PLAAF ultimately acquires its AEW 
assets, its intention is to add AEW into the PLAAF inventory.  The AEW is essential in 
modern air combat in order to promote the most effective use of fighter assets against 
enemies, especially without a significant air-air refueling tanker fleet, and considering the 
potential long distances from fighter bases to possible combat zones.  Intelligence 
collection aircraft (ICA) is a complementary aspect or area of growing emphasis for the 
PLAAF.  The ICA is related to Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Electronic Warfare (EW), 
Communications Intelligence (COMINT), and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT).  Kenneth 
Allen argues that the PLAAF is bent upon acquiring such assets by purchasing and 
copying Israeli and Soviet platforms of these types. Moreover, the PLAAF also is trying 
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to modify its existing assets to adopt such capabilities.86  These capabilities were 
demonstrated by the United States in Iraq and proved the value and importance of their 
role in modern combat. 
In addition to the variety of existing constraints in the development of 
PLAAF, there also is another internal aspect, namely the resource competition with the 
PLAN’s goal of acquiring an aircraft carrier.  One of the PLAAF’s missions is to support 
PLAN operations. Aerial support in naval operation is extremely valuable, and debates 
continue over whether having an aircraft carrier that could replace PLAAF assets would 
be a viable alternative course of action for PLA leadership.  According to Godwin, 
however, the cost of acquiring and maintaining an aircraft carrier and assets required to 
protect such a large and vulnerable platform is not reasonable (in comparison with 
PLAAF costs to capabilities).87 Therefore, the prospect of continued PLAAF 
modernization at a fast pace remains more likely than a large diversion of PLAAF 
resources to support the aircraft carrier project.   
c. Conclusion 
The PLAAF is facing many constraints in its modernization and expansion 
of future combat capabilities. More germane to this thesis is understanding what kind of 
assets with which capabilities the PLAAF is trying or expected to procure, rather than 
focusing on whether or not the PLAAF actually can acquire a certain capability.   
The PLAAF is adding late-generation high-capability fighters, as well as 
those resources that extend its operational capabilities such as tankers, information 
gathering assets, command and control assets, and electronic warfare assets as well.  This 
PLAAF process and the PLA leadership decisions supporting this extensive 
modernization may be interpreted, when taken in conjunction with the PLA ground and 
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maritime force modernizations, as an indicator that the PLA, including its Air Forces, is 
intent upon becoming the most capable and powerful military in the region, just as 
Gurtov argues.   
D. CONCLUSION 
The PLA modernization has been the result of conscious leadership decisions to 
insulate or protect China against any threats that could be posed by internal and external 
elements.  China’s force modernization has adapted or changed in its international and 
regional dynamic or context. The PLA doctrine has been the starting point for 
modernizations, and PLA doctrine has been transformed or reformed from “people’s 
war” to “local and limited war under high-tech modern condition.” The concept in this 
evolution or change was the realization that massive mobilization for a total war to 
annihilate one’s enemy is obsolete. Effective, efficient, and concise war has become the 
trend.  In order to implement these revised, modern concepts of war, the PLA needs to be 
high-tech-based, more precise, more lethal, capable of rapid, joint-service operations 
based on new command and control, and information-gathering assets.   
The PLA’s ground, maritime and air forces have been modernized in accordance 
with these changes in doctrine.  Although all PLA services have struggled with budget 
constraints and adopting new technologies, all three services have been moving forward.  
The Ground Force has pursued rapid reaction forces, more mechanized and more lethal 
forces.  Maritime forces have been obtaining required assets to project power further out 
from China’s coastline.  In terms of power projection, even the concept of an aircraft 
carrier has been seriously and deeply considered by the PLA.  PLA air forces also have 
constantly evolved and acquired new precision weapons and more lethal platforms while 
simultaneously working to extend the operational range and information management 
assets of its force.   
Conclusively, the scope and direction of the PLA ground, maritime, and air force 
modernizations are providing enough evidence to conclude that the PLA is intent upon 
obtaining pre-emptive operations, aggressive and active defense capabilities for its new 
military forces.  Such modernizations are greatly extending the PLA’s capability to 
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project military power and to promote China’s national interests as well as to protect its 
security.  In a realistic assessment, Nan Li briefly describes PLA modernization as 
follows: “The consequences of these changes on the security of China’s neighbors has 
already been felt.  For this reason, the PLA requires more careful scrutiny, and China’s 
defense policy and posture more serious rethinking.”88 
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III. RELATIONSHIPS OF SOUTH KOREA, CHINA, AND THE 
UNITED STATES 
The previous chapter has shown where PLA modernization is heading and what 
kind of capability the PLA will have to promote or secure China’s perceived national 
interests.  China’s intention has been to reshape its military into a force capable of 
projecting power further away from its territory and operate under a doctrine in which its 
capabilities might be used in pre-emptive actions.  The PLAN, in particular, is focused on 
securing and supporting China’s interests in the South China Sea and its actions and 
developments have signaled China’s intent to extend its military reach toward its 
neighbors.  If China’s strategic arsenal of nuclear weapons is considered as well, the 
dangers posed to the neighboring nations are even greater, even as China claims it has 
such forces only for deterrence purposes. 
This chapter will investigate security relations between South Korea, China, and 
the United States.  Since the purpose of this thesis is to identify the effect of PLA 
modernization on South Korean security, an examination of security relations between 
South Korea and China will initiate this section. It is obvious, but still needs stating, that 
this review needs to include an examination of the United States’ role in Northeast Asia 
because of the significant U.S. influence and presence there—especially regarding 
Korean security.  The three relationships of South Korea-China, South Korea-the United 
States, and China-the United States may provide insights into the question of how and 
what the present security conditions are among these three nations in the region;  it also 
may explain several “hot issues” that those three nations are confronting. 
All of the elements of national power influence relations among nations. The 
traditional construct or analysis generally considers four elements of national power 
including: diplomacy, informational power, military power, and economic power.  
Diplomacy represents the governmental official standpoint.  Information includes the 
culture and the historical aspects.  The military deals with pragmatic security-related 
issues (vice the limited force-on-force considerations).  Finally, economic aspects provide 
the national purpose of commercial or welfare interests. 
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A. SOUTH KROEA—CHINA RELATIONSHIP 
From ancient history, relations between Korea and China have vacillated between 
friend and foe.89  The relationship has varied depending on both domestic and 
international conditions.  After World War II, with the emergence of the Cold War, China 
was occupied by a communist regime and Korea was divided into two different regimes: 
communist in the North and democratic in the South.  During that period, both South 
Korea and China faced each other as an enemy’s ally.  As the Cold War evolved, that 
relationship hardened, and remained so until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989.  In 
1992, South Korea and China finally reestablished official diplomatic relations.  One 
immediate side effect of this change was that this reestablishment forced South Korea to 
terminate its official diplomatic relationship with Taiwan.  Since both China’s and 
Korea’s governments were established after World War II, and experienced a mutually 
adversarial relationship until the end of Cold War, any sudden move toward friendly trust 
was not easy, nor to be expected.  
However, since China’s reform era, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the 
economic development of China became a central goal for China; and under these new 
conditions, cooperating with South Korea was now beneficial to China, and vice versa.  
Kornberg and Faust note that “However, security issues may conflict with these 
economic goals.  China’s leaders will have to assess if and when security goals will 
necessarily supersede economic goals.  Their decisions will have a profound effect on 
East Asia and the world.”90  In other words, the economic goals, so far in China, have 
superseded other interests.  More precisely, Jae Ho Chung describes Sino-South Korean 
relations as follows:91 
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First, China needs a peaceful international environment in which first, 
China needs a peaceful international environment in which it can devote 
itself fully to modernization. Second, China needs capital and technology 
from the outside, without which the modernization plan cannot be 
achieved. Third, the open-door policy, the logical consequence of the 
desire for external assistance, requires flexibility rather than the 
dogmatism of the Mao era. These three characteristics at work in Chinese 
policy toward Korea mean that: (1) China seeks peace and stability on the 
peninsula, any disruption of which will lead Beijing to an agonizing 
dilemma between supporting North Korea and antagonizing the United 
States and Japan, or standing by idly and losing North Korea completely 
to the Soviet Union; (2) China sees benefit in economic contacts with 
South Korea, which can help China gain foreign currency and medium-
level technology through trade and joint ventures; and (3) the opening and 
the maintenance of the contacts require abandonment of China's 
antagonistic and dogmatic posture toward South Korea.  
Therefore, the South Korea-China relationship will be dealt with in several 
aspects. 
1. Diplomatic Aspect 
Diplomacy is implemented in accordance with national strategic policy. Taeho 
Kim provides insight into China’s strategic goals on the Korean peninsula, which he 
states are: “a) stability and tension reduction; b) economic cooperation with South Korea 
and traditional ties with North Korea; c) its own role and influence, which often come at 
the expense of the ubiquitous United States; and d) harmonization of its peninsular 
interests with its global and regional ones—most notably its own unification agenda for 
Taiwan.”92   
For stability purposes, China has been actively involved in organizing Six-Party 
Talks regarding North Korean nuclear issues.  In tension reduction, China maintains 
diplomatic relations with both North and South Korea, so that its relations may stand at 
the center of tension; and China’s decisions or actions may influence the tension in 
accordance with its (China’s) national interests.  Since China’s national interests center 
on economic prosperity, its diplomatic relations stimulate other elements to support the  
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economic element.  In other words, diplomatic relations endeavor to form favorable 
conditions for China to enhance its economic interests. Such actions are correlated to “its 
own role and influence.”  
Indeed, since the Sino-South Korea diplomatic reestablishment, both nations have 
enhanced diplomatic interactions.  Regarding this situation, Taeho Kim comments “In 
short, the generational turnover in the Chinese leadership, in tandem with its need to 
maintain political and social stability, would likely reinforce its current pragmatic policy 
orientation toward the Korean peninsula…. [I]t will continue to put an emphasis on the 
importance of growing ties with Seoul.”93  Diplomacy on the issue of unification on the 
Korean peninsula also may provide a favorable standpoint for China in the international 
context.  Suggesting peaceful, but independent and gradual unification on the Korean 
peninsula may let China represent its peaceful intention, independent from United States 
intervention, and provide enough time to prepare for an unaffected unification.  
Therefore, China’s diplomatic relations with South Korea are well calculated and based 
on its own self-interest, vice any notion of promoting prosperity of the region.  The 
corollary to this observation is that there is a possibility that any time when China’s 
interests are no longer being met, it is (at best) uncertain that China will maintain its 
current posture.  China may need more credible confidence building measures. 
North Korea and Taiwan play similar roles in China- South Korea diplomatic 
relations.  However, South Korea discontinued formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan 
when it reestablished its relationship with China. On the other hand, China continues to 
maintain diplomatic relations with North Korea.  Maintenance or discontinuance of a 
state’s diplomatic relations with another nation is not a simple matter, and other states 
are, by definition or situation, involved in the issue.  A sudden collapse of North Korea 
may or may not be beneficial to China.  Such uncertainty may have been a reason for 
China’s constant diplomatic relationship with North Korea.  Conversely, the 
discontinuation of diplomatic relations with Taiwan for South Korea would not affect 
either state critically in the important area of economics or trade.  Throughout the period 
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of that change, the United States has served as a Sino–Taiwan stabilizer, or performed a 
pivotal security role.  Therefore, even though China maintains diplomatic relations with 
North Korea, it could re-establish relations with South Korea.   
2. Information Aspect 
On the informational aspect, both China and South Korea conduct significant 
amounts of cultural information sharing.  Information in areas vital to national security 
such as nuclear, military high technology, and information warfare are not in the scope of 
this effort. However cultural and academic aspects are widely shared between the two 
countries.   
Taeho Kim, according to an interview with ROK’s ambassador to the PRC, 
describes the trend as follows, “The frequency of contacts between the two sides is 
evidenced by over 20,000 Korean companies in operation throughout China, 380 
passenger flights per week (i.e., about 54 flights per day), and by about 38,000 Korean 
students in China. Which means that as there are altogether over 85,000 foreign students 
in China, two out of five foreign students in China come from South Korea!” and “An 
array of other impressive statistics abounds in the area of tourism, educational and 
cultural ties—most notably the co-called ‘Korean wave’ (Hanliu) and ‘China fever’—
boosting cultural ties between the two countries.  This positive trend—which is likely to 
continue for the foreseeable future—will undoubtedly contribute to the ROK’s economic 
development.”94 
This increasing social-informational activity may not always result in a positive 
end-state.  The more interaction between the two cultures, the more conflicts may arise.  
Historical reevaluations that are related to territorial issues, violations of regulations due 
to the differences in culture, and discontent stemming from economic activities between 
the two may rise as double-edged sword. 
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3. Military Aspect 
In the military arena, which is the final and critical element in protecting national 
security, relations have not been considered or as actively pursued between the two, 
although there is general military diplomacy to promote positive military relations.  
Superficially, China and South Korea have exchanged interactions of high military 
officials and naval ship visits to each other’s ports.  However, pragmatic military actions 
and combined exercises have yet to be considered or conducted.   
In Taeho Kim’s article, Sino-South Korea relations are described as follows, 
“Between South Korea and China, on the other hand, there have been more frequent, 
more regular, and higher-level visits in recent years in the so-called ‘military exchanges 
and cooperation’ field.”95 And, “[T]heir militaries have gradually but steadily increased 
the scope of military-to-military exchanges and cooperation.  It should be noted, 
however, that compared with the other nonmilitary aspects of their bilateral ties the 
‘military exchanges and cooperation’ have yet to be balanced and institutionalized.”96 
Relatively speaking, the United States and South Korea share a significant amount 
of military cooperation including combined exercises. Moreover, Japan and the United 
States also conduct combined military exercises, especially combined naval exercises in 
Hawaii: the Rim of Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, held biannually with all three nations 
included.  Of course, relations of U.S.—South Korea and Japan are not like the 
relationship of Sino-South Korea.  If the diplomatic, information, and economic areas of 
Sino-South Korean relations prosper, then military aspects will follow with a closer 
connection as well.  In fact, however, there has never been a combined military operation 
other than a humanitarian assistance exercise conducted between China and South Korea 
within the region.   
The Sino-South Korea relationship seems based on the national interests of the 
two nations, which seek aversion, and opportunism, as any other nations in the world.  
The guiding aspect or point for this relationship is that it may be fragile because the 
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common interests China and South Korea share may not be strong enough to maintain in 
a positive manner when they face problems or issues in their relationship. Economic 
prosperity is a goal for both nations, but it is difficult to limit national satisfaction or 
contacts to economics, even if there is shared economic prosperity. It is likely that under 
current conditions, the current positive relations could be undermined if other factors rise 
between the commercial contacts. Therefore, the current connection may be interpreted 
as not being a security-building factor that would promote mutual understanding or trust 
between the two nations.  
Taeho Kim says of Sino-South Korea relations, “In short, the current state of the 
Sino-South Korean relationship can be likened to standing right in the eye of the typhoon 
without knowing where the shelter is, or to what Chairman Mao Zedong opined in the 
late 1950s in the middle of the disastrous ‘Great Leap Forward’—‘dizzy with success,’ 
which claimed the lives of 30 million people.”97  Therefore, in order to strengthen mutual 
bonds and anticipate positive and productive relations for the prosperity in the region, 
enhancing military relations seems to be the effective answer.   
In conclusion, historically, China and South Korea have experienced both positive 
and negative relations. Even after diplomatic normalization, the relationship remains 
based on limited factors such as economic interests or an aversion to North Korean 
instability. It is not grounded in a wider, or deeper shared vision of regional interests. The 
two nations have not and still are not building credibility between their two militaries 
except on a limited, perhaps superficial level.  Therefore, current conditions between the 
two states may still be considered as fragile, and additional efforts would be required to 
create credible trust and stability in the region.  
4. Economic Aspect 
Sino-South Korean economic relations is a most remarkable area.  Data from 
South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade show that in 2004, total trade 
(including Hong Kong) with China was U.S.$99.8 billion and in 2004 it was 
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U.S.$222.3 billion.  South Korea’s total trade in 2008 was U.S.$877 billion and the 
amount of trade with China in 2008 was U.S.$222 billion. China trade is more than 25 
percent of South Korea’s total trade.  Furthermore, the trade surplus with China, 
including Hong Kong, was U.S.$32 billion, which is South Korea’s largest trade surplus. 
For example, the relative trade surplus with the United States was (only) U.S.$8 billion.98  
Additionally, considering China’s potential market, the total amount of trade has the 
possibility of growing even further.  
However, Taeho Kim warns “At the same time, however, it should be borne in 
mind that Korea’s increasing economic dependency on China is a double-edged sword 
which could restrain the ROK’s diplomatic options by allowing China to enhance its 
position and influence on the peninsula.”99 
In sum, it is quite obvious that the economic relationship between China and 
South Korea has taken off and is still growing.  Also, there are no doubts that such a 
relationship is contributing to each side’s national interests.  However relying too much 
on one aspect is not a healthy structure for the long term, otherwise constant credit-
building measures should be implemented.  Economic relations with China are 
contributing to the prosperity of South Korea, but it also may simultaneously be fostering 
too much reliance on and fostering new constraints or limits to South Korea’s national 
strategic decisions in other aspects. 
5. Conclusion 
The overall Sino-South Korea relationship seems positive, but it has several 
vulnerable points, which may be causes of fragility in the relationship.  The Sino-South 
Korean relationship is enjoying shared benefits. However, South Korean leaders should 
be mindful that the current relationship is fragile and additional confidence building 
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measures should be followed.  Even if such measures are implemented, it will take quite 
a long time to build the credibility.  Therefore, relations with China should be cautiously 
monitored and constant efforts to enhance the relationship should be followed.  Taeho 
Kim illustrates this by saying, “In the long and often tortuous path to Korean security and 
unification, China will be no substitute for the United States for the foreseeable future…. 
[I]t is necessary to understand correctly that the ongoing trends and developments in 
South Korea’s interactions with the United States and China could be of a fundamental 
and lasting nature, to warrant cooler thinking on the unfolding strategic configuration for 
the Korean peninsula and beyond.”100 
B. SOUTH KOREA--THE UNITED STATES RELATIONSHIP 
The recurring question by leaders and analysts in both countries is whether or not 
the South Korea-United States relationship is strong or weak.  This question will be 
considered here through the four aspects of national power.   
The background of the relationship between the two nations is as follows. Korea 
obtained its independence as the result of Japan’s unconditional surrender at the end of 
WW II.  The method to resolve the question of how to manage the process of establishing 
or liberating the newly-independent nations post WW II was discussed in the Moscow 
Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1945.  The decision or result for the Korean 
Peninsula was to execute trusteeship, with the Soviets in North Korea and the United 
States in South Korea.  In 1950, the Korean War started, and the United States intervened 
as the United Nations’ force, and People’s Republic of China intervened as the Chinese 
People’s Voluntary force in support of the DPRK.  Since then, for half a century, the 
United States’ forces have been stationed in South Korea.  Despite many debates about 
United States’ forces being stationed in South Korea, there is no doubt that the forces 
have been defending South Korea from a North Korean attack on South.  Especially, the 
United States forces in South Korea deterred the possibility of the PRC’s support or  
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intervention in case of a North Korean coercive military action toward South Korea.  
Therefore, the relationship between South Korea and the United States may be 
considered concrete, overall. 
1. Diplomatic Aspect 
The South Korea-the United States diplomatic relationship originated in the Cold 
War as part of the United States’ containment policy.  The United States’ support for 
South Korea can be understood in the same perspective.  The support was not only in 
military issues,  but also in economic and information areas.  After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the South Korea-the United States diplomatic 
relationship faced a new security context.  South Korea’s primary enemy, North Korea, 
was a rogue state, and it started to threaten its neighboring countries.  Also, the DPRK’s 
nuclear program was to become a concern for South Korea and the United States, along 
with the United States’ anti-terror policy.   
A wider consideration of security issues in the region also reveals that northeast 
Asia’s flashpoints for possible conflicts are not confined to the North Korean situation, 
but also have the potential to involve China, Russia, and Japan, whose territorial issues 
remain unresolved and among which are historical disputes that originate from cultural 
pride, or resources interests.  
Woosang Kim and Tae-hyo Kim, therefore, suggest “The ROK-U.S. alliance has 
been a cornerstone of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, and it will continue to 
play a central role in the peaceful unification process.  A robust ROK-U.S. alliance not 
only contributes to deter North Korean military adventurism, but it also restrains potential 
regional power competition among China, Russia and Japan….The alliance should also 
look beyond the Korean Peninsula and contribute to facilitating peace and prosperity in 
East Asia.”101  Jae-Chang Kim also addresses his argument on the reasons for enhancing 
the South Korea –United States alliance, “For the alliance, there are, logically three 
choices open to South Korea: The first is to maintain the current U.S.-ROK alliance; the 
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second is to establish an alliance with one of its neighboring countries instead of the 
United States.; and the third is to adopt a stance of neutrality in international 
relations….Thus, realistically, there is no better alternative to the U.S.-ROK alliance for 
South Korea.”102  Jae-Chang Kim also mentions the United States’ further decision 
regarding its relationship with South Korea, “It is important for the United States to 
maintain a strong alliance with South Korea, considering its democracy, economic 
vitality, and its geopolitical location.  Thus, the United States wants to prepare for the 
U.S.-ROK alliance to make contributions to the broader stability of the region over the 
longer term.”103  To enhance the diplomatic relations which may stand still for a long 
period, Woosang Kim and Jae-Chang Kim argue that “it is entirely up to the wisdom and 
leadership of the South Korean administration,”104 and “Rather than inspired leadership 
of the U.S.-ROK alliance, we need a better system for the alliance—in which the United 
States and ROK share the same threat perceptions, the same strategic goals, and the same 
strategic concepts, which can induce North Korea to adopt meaningful change.  This 
would pave the road to long-term collaboration, creating a better world for all.”105 
In sum, the diplomatic relationship between South Korea and the United States is 
robust, but requires further efforts by both sides to maintain such robustness.  However, 
other elements and states may influence or limit and constrain this relationship. In other 
words, it is not in a shatterproof condition.  Therefore, a constant effort to promote 
peaceful security in the region by the leaders of South Korea and the United States to 
work toward a systematic alliance is still required.   
2. Information Aspect 
Information, including cultural and historical elements in South Korea, has been 
influenced by the United States.  The influence was grounded in aid and support from the 
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United States as a result of the Cold War.  However, South Korean democratization has 
changed South Korea’s perspective on support and aid.  This new attitude has mainly 
been driven by the cultivation of self-pride and a nationalistic movement.  Such a 
movement has caused anti-American sentiment.  Another possible element that stimulates 
anti-American sentiment may be the indifferent United States posture on territorial 
disputes (Dokdo Island) between South Korea and Japan.  The United States’ position on 
this issue is not easy since it would need to choose a side between South Korea and 
Japan.  However, South Korean public opinion is, in general,  in favor of the United 
States’ South Korea friendly support and policy on the issue.  So far, the United States’ 
decision has been not to intervene. Other issues that have created anti-American 
sentiment have been mentioned in Woosang Kim and Tae-hyo Kim’s article, and include 
the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the United States and South Korea, 
violent acts and toxic waste disposal by military personnel of the United States Forces 
Korea.106  Therefore, South Korean anti-American sentiment may have eroded mutual 
relations in a visible or possibly significant manner.  This issue of anti-American 
sentiment could grow from a concern to a problem when other nations, such as North 
Korea or China, seek to use such sentiments, in favor of their interests. 
Considering the fact that there are many issues remaining that may worsen the 
anti-American sentiment of the South Korean public, it is both governments’ roles and 
missions to resolve such issues wisely in order to strengthen the alliance that has lasted 
for more than half a decade.  South Korea is heavily reliant for its security on the United 
States.  Therefore, the United States may have to intervene actively, independently of its 
own national interest.  Otherwise, the different perceptions and expectations of the South 
Korean government and its public regarding the United States’ action may become a 
cornerstone of unfavorable anti-American sentiment, which may become a vulnerability 
to the alliance.  
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3. Military Aspect 
The military aspect of South Korea and the United States’ relationship goes back 
to post WWII times and the Korean War.  The year 2003 was the 50th anniversary of 
ROK—U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).  The military alliance not only deterred 
South Korea’s major threat, North Korea, but also prevented North Korean attempts to 
proliferate weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  Also, it has prevented the arms race 
among the nations in the Northeast Asia region.107  However, Seong Ryoul Cho argues, 
“Changes in the ROK-U.S. Alliance have always been initiated by the unilateral 
strategies devised by the United States, and South Korea has been faced with the 
dilemma posed by the alliance, so it could do nothing but react to U.S.-initiated strategic 
changes.”108  Therefore, he argues that “[I]n the new circumstances in which the former 
Soviet Union collapsed, thus removing the major external threat to U.S. supremacy, the 
ROK-U.S. alliance formed in the Cold War had to be redefined in accordance with the 
changing strategic environment of the 21st century.”109 
Despite a long and confident military relationship for South Korea and the United 
States, the challenge will be that the relationship must change in accordance with the new 
security circumstances of the region.  Furthermore, the change should also consider South 
Korean domestic anti-American sentiment as well.  However, in this process, there does 
not appear to be a clear or easy to pursue course of action. The direction of change should 
prevent rise of new regional hegemonic power, competition in the arms races, and 
execution of military conflict.  Seong Ryoul Cho articulates the possible threats and 
issues that South Korea confronts as follows, “This kind of nuclear brinkmanship by 
North Korea shows that there still exists a clear military threat from that country,” and 
“These deterrence strategies by the United States against China will have a great impact 
on the direction of the ‘redefinition’ that the ROK-U.S. alliance will take in the 21st 
century.... This ‘China factor’ is most likely to be a significant factor in ‘redefining ‘ the 
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ROK-U.S. alliance in the 21st century.”110  Therefore, the challenge in the relationship is 
how to avoid such problems.  Limiting factors are, first, the security threat posed by 
North Korea; second, the reaction of China; and third, South Korean domestic sentiment.  
These limiting factors may form  the weakest link of the relationship.   
North Korea and the unification of the Korean peninsula addresses the dilemma 
that if the military relationship of South Korea and the United States is strengthened, 
along with the USFK’s size, then North Korea would continue to maintain a tense 
relationship with South Korea.  However, due to the role that the USFK is providing on 
the Korean peninsula, its existence alone may deter the possibility of North Korean 
military coercive actions.  Therefore, if the USFK is withdrawn or reduced, considering 
the close distance between North and South Korea, such a reduction of the deterrence 
capability may be interpreted as a weakening of South Korean security.   
China’s reaction to the enhancement of the South Korea-United States military 
relationship may actually be a motivation or a PLA justification and point of legitimacy 
for its modernization and strengthening.  So far, China has argued that the PLA’s 
modernization is adequate for the size and stand of China’s international status.  On the 
contrary, if the USFK is reduced, China will likely maintain the scope and direction  of 
the PLA modernization. Despite any enhancement of the USFK, China already has 
initiated PLA modernization and strengthening.  A reduction in the USFK would not 
impose any corresponding positive reaction by China.  Therefore, South Korea and the 
United States military relations should consider their significance on the active, friendly 
posture of other nations in the region. 
The last factor to consider in the relationship between the U.S. and South Korea is 
South Korean domestic anti-American sentiment.  In addition to the United States’ 
policy, the USFK has been a major issue for anti-American sentiment among the South 
Korean public.  Reasons previously mentioned in informational aspects should be  
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analyzed as well as the need to maintain the presence of U.S. forces effectively enough to 
deter North Korean irrational decisions and the further possibility of a regional 
hegemonic appearance.   
In conclusion, the military relationship of South Korea and the United States 
addresses where and how to manage the new security context in the region.  So far, the 
relocation and re-adjustment of the USFK, combined with the return of wartime 
operational control from (U.S.-lead) Combined Forces Command to the South Korean 
government, has been planned and initiated.  Such processes, however, have pros and 
cons for South Korean security.  Scaling down the USFK can result in a rise of North 
Korean confidence and may undermine the deterrence effect; however, it also may satisfy 
the South Korean public’s sentiment against the United States and reduce the legitimacy 
of PLA assertions of its need to build capability and implement a doctrine of expansion.  
However, maintaining the status quo, or preserving the middle ground, while not 
triggering any conflict or spotlighting United States’ interests in the region is not an easy 
task.   
One obvious answer is that under any circumstances, the United States and South 
Korean military relations should not be unilateral, but bilateral, considering both nations’ 
interests and promotion of peace in the region.  Otherwise, the relationship would not be 
suitable for the longer term of peace. 
4. Economic Aspect 
The economic relationship between South Korea and the United States was 
originally fostered by the United States’ intention to contain the Soviet Union and China 
during the Cold War. The U.S. supported and aided South Korea so that South Korea 
could grow enough to sustain and protect itself.  However, the current South Korean 
economy is now a developed economy.  According to the South Korean Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, the GDP has constantly increased. For example, in 1997 
South Korea’s GDP was South Korean (Won) 484,102.8 billion and in 2007, the GDP 
increased to South Korean (Won) 1,023,937.7 billion.  The size of South Korean trade 
increased remarkably from U.S. $ 1,068 million in 1971 to U.S.$ 150,653 million in 
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2007.  The South Korean world trade rank was twelfth in 2008. South Korean trade with 
the United States constantly increased.  In 2003, it reached a mark of U.S.$ 34,219 
million.111  The data show just how much South Korea’s economy relies on the United 
States.  However, frictions remain between South Korea and the United States.  South 
Korea has benefited from friendly support, and South Korea’s economy, but such 
economic benefits actually are decreasing under the concept of free trade.  This change 
also fosters creates public dislike toward the United States.   
The present South Korean economy has shifted from relying on the United States 
to evolving into a multiple counterpart trade mechanism.  In 2003, the records show that 
the top trade partner shifted from the United States to China.  This diversifying progress 
relieves both nations from dependency and pressure to support one.  A possible 
vulnerable point, however, may yet appear as anti-American sentiment lingers due to 
reforms of the South Korea-United States trade relationship.  Currently, the Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) with the United States is being processed, and when implemented, it 
may create public opposition as well. 
In conclusion, the South Korea –United States economic relationship is stable and 
at the mature stage.  However, South Korean public antagonism lingers and must still be 
considered. Leaders must convince the public that sensibly enhancing the relationship 
will benefit both nations in the long run.  Letting unfavorable sentiments exist unchecked 
in South Korea, may undermine the overall South Korea-United States alliance. 
5. Conclusion  
Major problems in the South Korean-United States relationship are a reaction by 
neighboring nations to the South Korea-United States relationship.  Second, a major 
problem for the relationship is South Korea’s domestic anti-American sentiment.  
Therefore, the relationship is now confronting a difficult stage where it must change from  
 
 
                                                 
111 Data was accumulated from Republic of Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
http://www.mofat.go.kr/economic/economicdata/statistics/index.jsp, Eurinara Gyungjetongsang Tonggye 
(2002 – 2008) [South Korean economic commerce statistics (2002–2008)], (accessed October 28, 2009). 
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an obsolete structure to a future oriented structure.  If this change fails, the result may 
seriously affect not only the relationship between the two nations, but also the region as a 
whole.   
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IV. PROBLEM ANALYSIS 
Previous chapters have identified the PLA’s modernization and its objectives, as 
well as South Korean relations with China and with the United States in diplomatic, 
informational, military, and economic aspects.  The combination of these factors and 
conclusions offered in the preceding sections suggest that the PLA modernization may be 
expected to impose threatening conditions not only for South Korea but also for the entire 
Northeast Asia region.  The relationships of South Korea in several aspects show that 
both relations (China-South Korea and U.S.-South Korea) contain vulnerable elements 
with the potential to undermine South Korean security.   
This chapter will integrate the connection of South Korean security and PLA 
modernization in several regional “hot issue” cases.  First, these cases will be separated 
into two different categories: direct and indirect threats to South Korea.  Each issue will 
be reviewed as regards the pros and cons of the four elements that have been considered 
in the previous chapter.  Additionally, the link or connection of the modernized PLA with 
enhanced capabilities will also be factored.    
As a frame of reference, there are several core security issues in the region.  These 
issues seem to be motivated by efforts to protect maritime resources by preserving or 
securing maritime territory. In general, when the conflict issue is territorial in nature, then 
the “offensive side” tends to publicize the issue and the “defending” side tends to stay 
quiet, unless severely provoked or offended, since in this case the “defendant” already 
dominates the disputed territory. Finally, if these are not resource-related issues, then 
they typically link back to sovereignty. 
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A. DIRECT THREAT TO SOUTH KOREAN SECURITY 
1. The Socotra Rock Dispute 
The Socotra Rock case still holds the potential for conflict between South Korea 
and China. Guo’s book describes the history of the Socotra Rock dispute.112  The 
problem of the Socotra Rock is that South Korea and China agreed that the issue was to 
be agreed on in accordance with the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) concept, but a clear 
regulatory line was never drawn.  Therefore, the possibility of a lingering or rising 
dispute still exists.  Without mutual agreement about the rock, the site may become a 
flashpoint, which may lead to a possible threat because the two sides’ public sentiment is 
strong. However, on the other hand, the economic and strategic benefits of a solution are 
valuable enough for both governments to turn their policies toward a more cooperative 
solution, even if it is superficial policy.113  
a. Diplomatic Aspect of the Socotra Rock Dispute 
The diplomatic aspect of the Socotra Rock dispute is that agreement was 
reached in a mutual diplomatic process, however, the solution was never clearly defined.  
Only the method for concluding was agreed upon, namely that it would be regarded as an 
EEZ issue, not a territorial matter.  South Korea, in fact, officially no longer claims the 
rock as its territory.  The rock lies in an area of overlap for both side’s EEZ, where the 
South Korean government has restrained its maritime ore development (inside 
                                                 
112 Guo, Rongxing, TERRITORIAL DISPUTES and RESOURCE MANAGEMENT A Global 
Handbook (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2007), 226–277.  Guo explains that Socotra Rock is 
rock below sea level at low tide.  It is “located 149 km southwest from Marado island, South Korea and 
245 km northeast from Haijiao islands in the northeast corner of Zhoushan archipelago, China.”  Republic 
of Korea refers to it as Ieodo or Parangdo, and PRC refers to it as Suyan Rock.  “In 1900 Socotra Rock was 
discovered by the British merchant vessel Socotra.” “From 1995 to 2001, South Korea built the Ieodo 
Ocean Research Station on Socotra Rock despite Chinese objection.”  “According to the UNCLOS, a 
submerged reef cannot be claimed as territory by any country.  However, China and South Korea claim it 
as part of their respective EEZs.  “On Marado there is an ancient stele carved ‘the southmost of Korea.’”  
“The Chinese insist that Socotra Rock is not Korea’s territory since its location is further south to South 
Korea’s southmost island, Marado.  If this is true, Marado, as a starting point of Korean marginal sea, 
affects the Korean EEZ.”        
113 Yong Gu Kim, “Legal Appraisal in View of the Law of the Sea: China’s Jurisdictional Assertions 
and Other Maneuvering in relating to the title of Socotra Rock (Yieo-do),” Northeast Asian History 
Foundation Research Series, no. 28 (Seoul Korea: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2008), 17–19. 
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overlapping areas).  However, in 2006, China initiated a research and development 
program that was very close to the borderline at its most extended line of its EEZ.114 
The results and official posture are still ambiguous and vulnerable.  Also, 
China seems to have provoked South Korea without actively seeking to solve the dispute 
diplomatically.  There is the strong factor of public sentiment on the issue.  China, unlike 
South Korea, seems to allow public sentiment to consider the issue as a territorial issue 
and to claim sovereignty of the rock.115  Maritime territorial issues do not simply get 
argued and resolved by geographical distance from coast lines, but are also considered in 
terms of other factors.116  Therefore, the rock issue needs to be dealt with in a peaceful, 
diplomatic manner.  However, the process has stagnated and even has been engendering 
unfavorable public sentiment that may undermine not only the issue but also the overall 
relation of the two nations. 
b. Informational Aspect of Socotra Rock Dispute 
The informational aspect of this dispute is more vulnerable because this 
may be used as the stimulus factor to escalating the issue to an undesirable destructive 
path.  Yong Gu Kim highlights this in the beginning of his article, namely that the 
Chinese government’s policy toward the Socotra rock dispute and the policy to deal with 
China’s public sentiment may be understood as China’s Northeast Project, which is re-
interpreting ancient history between China and Korea. History may provide the basis for 
public sentiment and government policy.  Also, such formations of public opinion may 
legitimize China’s further actions to manage Socotra rock as a sovereign issue.  In sum, 
constant provocative actions and a “loose” Chinese governmental policy may undermine  
 
 
                                                 
114 This source was from Hwang, Jun Sik’s, who is in international law department South Korean 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, paper on national policy briefing posted 2.6.2007, respond to South 
Korean TV SBS Tracking News, 1.24.2007, “Ieodo project—China, their goal?”  
115 Yong Gu Kim, “Legal Appraisal in View of the Law of the Sea: China’s Jurisdictional Assertions 
and Other Maneuvering in relating to the title of Socotra Rock (Yieo-do),” Northeast Asian History 
Foundation Research Series, no. 28 (Seoul Korea: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2008), 17–19. 
116 Ibid., 37–49. 
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the overall relationship between the two countries. In addition, this issue has the potential 
to fragment the sentiment of the nations in the region to obstruct formation of credible 
peaceful security in the region. 
c. Economic Aspect of Socotra Rock Dispute 
Economics is also a basis of the Socotra rock dispute.117  Ieodo is located 
in the middle of the East China Sea continental shelf where vast amount of maritime ore 
is embedded.  For any developing or expanding national economy, such a resource is 
critical.  Therefore, the continental shelf has been a competitive site among nations in the 
region.  Some posit that this is a reason why China is risking its diplomatic relations and 
re-interpreting history.  There is incentive to gain an advantage in mineral development, 
which could contribute to the growth of a powerful nation and foster economic 
development as well.  However, such ambition and interest applies not only to China but 
other nations in the region.  Therefore, such dispute and conflict is inevitable 
d. Military Aspect of Socotra Rock Dispute 
The military aspect is also an important strategic aspect.  Areas around the 
rock are located in the major Sea Line Of Communication (SLOC) to China and South 
Korea, in other words, the rock is strategically important to both countries.  In 
conjunction with China’s military modernization (with a long, extended coastline), the 
area in the vicinity of Socotra Rock is a critical sea route for the PLAN to proceed to the 
Pacific Ocean. 
In military operations, therefore, the South Korean Navy, and possibly 
even the United States Navy, or even the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force 
(JMSDF) Navy may at some point be charged by their governments with preserving the 
freedom of navigation for their ships unimpeded progress near the rock. These forces 
could impose limits or constrain any PLAN operations near the rock. 
                                                 
117 Yong Gu Kim, “Legal Appraisal in View of the Law of the Sea: China’s Jurisdictional Assertions 
and Other Maneuvering in relating to the title of Socotra Rock (Yieo-do),” Northeast Asian History 
Foundation Research Series, no. 28 (Seoul Korea: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2008), 19–22. 
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On the other hand, it would become important for the PLAN to ensure its 
own (complete) freedom of naval operations in that area.  In addition, South Korea may 
seek to rely significantly on the United States naval forces that are current providing 
security to the Korean Peninsula. From China’s perspective, the presence of the United 
States naval forces near the rock may limit China’s offensive actions (if needed).  
Furthermore, China has shown its coercive problem-solving approach in other maritime 
territorial disputes such as military coercion with Vietnam on the Paracel Islands and the 
Spratly Islands, or even seizing an atoll (Mischief Reef) from the Philippines.118  
Therefore, in order to mitigate the tension and problems, China must show strong 
evidence of its peaceful intentions on the issue of Socotra Rock.   
Chapter II identified the purpose and capability of the PLA.  The Socotra 
Rock dispute is related primarily to maritime forces.  The PLAN has been acquiring 
assets to project its force at ever-increasing distances from its coastal line.  As part of this 
effort, the PLA also has maintained its intent to build (at least) one aircraft carrier, as 
well.  Given such PRC policies and intentions, it is unwise to disregard the possibility of 
China’s use of force, if it is deemed necessary.  Along with public sentiment on historical 
and territorial approaches, the desperate necessity of natural resources may provide the 
atmosphere and justification for the use of its military.   
The PLAN modernization started in early 1980 along with PLA 
modernization.  Power projection capability was also acquired in the 1990s.  The South 
Korean Navy has started to recognize the PLAN’s modernization and enhancement of its 
capability.   The South Korean National Defense White Paper, in 1988, describes the 
intention of China as trying to reassert its traditional influence in the region, and to 
pursuing the blue-water navy concept by building the largest naval base in the Far East.  




                                                 
118 Tae Jun Kim, “Conflicts of Sovereign Rights over the Controversial Islans and Chinese 
Countermeasures,” Defense Policy Study, vol. 78, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 216. 
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mentioned the naval maritime supremacy of the South Korean Navy.  From 1991 
forward, the White Paper has constantly mentioned the need to acquire and preserve Sea 
Line of Communication (SLOC) security.119 
e. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the Socotra Rock is an unresolved dispute and regardless of 
the current position of the two nation’s officials and their public, unless there is closer, 
more precise cooperation that could satisfy both nations, it may remain a possible 
flashpoint and evolve into a conflict between the two, or even into an extended conflict.  
Additionally, the evidence, found in a South Korean National Defense White Paper, that 
the South Korean naval objective symmetrically developed as the PLAN changed toward 
a extended power projection capable force, underscores the assertion that South Korean 
military leaders view China’s position on the Socotra Rock dispute as an indirect security 
threat to South Korea, if not the possibility of a direct security threat. 
2. The Northeast Project 
The Northeast Project is a research project on the geography and the history of 
Northeast China.  Briefly, the project includes the old Joseon, Gogureyo, and Balhae 
history as China.  The problem to this approach is that Korea also claims for the histories 
of ancient kingdoms as part of its past.   The project was supervised by the Center for the 
Study of Borderland History and Geography (CBHG).  They combined with the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) to start the Northeast Project in February 2002.  The 
original title of the project was “Studies of the History and Geography of the Northeast 
Borderland and a Series of Phenomena.”  Hee Ok Lee summarizes the facts of the project 
stats that “The Northeast Project, a five-year (2002-2006) government project, is intended 
to collect data and conduct research on ancient Chinese territories and societies, mostly in 
Manchuria.”120   
                                                 
119 Republic of Korean Ministry of National Defence, National Defense White Paper, 1988, 1989, 
1991, http://www.mnd.go.kr/mndInfo/publication/policyDataBook/policyDataBook_1/index.jsp (accessed 
October 15 2009). 
120 Lee, Hee Ok, “China’s Northeast Project and South Korean-Chinese Relations,” Korea journal, 
vol. 45, issue 2 (2005): 239–264. 
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Academic scholars and provincial institutions initially conducted the Northeast 
Project.  Despite excuses that the regional provinces needed the central government’s 
attention, the central government policy and China’s Communist Party’s policy guided or 
was embedded in the project.  In other words, “China’s concentrated studies of Korean 
ancient history were conducted through the central government’s confirmation of 
research projects proposed by provincial governments and scholars.”121  
The project is superficially an academic and scholarly field of study, whose main 
content belongs to the informational aspect of national power.  However, considering the 
specific context of the material, it involves the diplomatic aspect between China and the 
two Koreas.  Also, there is a military aspect, which may be considered, as well as an 
economic aspect. 
a. Diplomatic Aspect of the Northeast Project 
Diplomatically, since the project deals with a history that is believed to be 
Korean, a collision of the two sides was inevitable.  Through the ongoing project, the 
diplomatic relationship between the two sides is likely to be irritated.  However, there is a 
more important factor that China has to protect than simply focusing on the relationship 
with South Korea: internal security.  Details of the internal security threat will be 
discussed later.  However, the point is that diplomatically, such governmental decisions 
that Beijing made on the project were disastrous, but solved eventually only in the 
context of the diplomatic relationship.  The South Korean MOFAT website describes the 
status of the diplomatic issue raised by the project.   Currently, both governments have 
mutually agreed to ceasing the distortion of Korean history and to correct any materials 
that are continuing to distort history.  Additionally, the two nations have agreed to hold a 
bilateral academic conference.122  However, despite such efforts, distorted information 
has already been distributed and nationalistic sentiments about the history have been 
                                                 
121 Lee, Hee Ok, “China’s Northeast Project and South Korean-Chinese Relations."Korea journal, vol. 
45, issue 2 (2005): 252. 
122 This data was acquired from South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade website, 
www.mofat.go.kr/press/hotissue/koguryo/index.jsp, number 2 Goguryeosa oeigok munje hyunhwang [the 
status of Goguryeo history distortion problem], 10.8.2007, (accessed October 28, 2009). 
 66
seeded.  In sum, the problem has been diplomatically settled.  However, it has initiated 
nationalistic public sentiment in both nations that may undermine the overall relationship 
of two nations.  
b. Informational Aspect of the Northeast Project 
The informational aspect is the most significant factor of the Northeast 
Project.  The definition of a nation, by Stalin, in Yoon Hwy-Tak’s article, is “a 
historically stable community of people, which shares a common vernacular language, 
occupies a single territory, has an integrated, coherent economy, and possesses a shared 
psychological make-up.”  In other words, the concept of nation is understood as a 
historical category and it is believed that individual nations have their own histories 
”from birth, to formation, to development, and to dissolution.”123  Additionally, 
“multicultural unity of Chinese nation” defined by China itself contains a self-
vulnerability by containing the possibility of separatism movement.   
The underlying reasons or motivations for China’s Northeast project are 
both internal and external.124  An unfavorable division movement in China is an internal 
problem.  China’s corresponding strategy in respect to the political climate of South and 
North Korea in the Korean peninsula, however, is an external problem.   
Hwy-Tak Yoon summarizes the background of the Northeast Project in 
her article as follows.125 
First, China implemented the project in order to lessen the 
consequences of future changes in the political climate of the 
Korean peninsula on the stability of northeast China, and to 
actively respond to the changed East Asian international order, … 
Second, the purpose of the Northeast Project is to apply the theory 
of ‘a multicultural unity of Chinese nation,’ stressing the notion of 
national unity, to the northeast region, thus completing Chinese 
historical identity, … Third, while spreading the perception that 
Manchuria is Chinese territory, not Korean and Goguryeo and 
                                                 
123 Yoon Hwy-Tak, “China’s Northeast Project and Korean History,” Korea Journal, vol. 45, issue 1 
(2005): 145. 
124 Ibid., 158. 
125 Ibid., 158–159. 
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Balhae belong to Chinese rather than Korean history, China strives 
to deny the connections between the Korean peninsula and the 
Chinese northeast region, … Fourth, if the theory that Old Joseon, 
Goguryeo, and Balhae all fall under Korean history is maintained, 
then the Uighur or other Central Asian countries can claim the 
history of the Western Regions as their own, and Vietnam will be 
able to place Baiyue and Nanyue Kingdom during the period of 
Qin-Han China under the rubric of their own history, … Fifth, 
China attempted to hinder North Korea in its efforts to register 
Goguryeo cultural remains as a UNESCO World Heritage site in 
order to eliminate any domestic or international opposition to the 
theory that Goguryeo history falls under China’s history. 
Those five reasons effectively explain the reasons for China’s Northeast 
Project.  In other words, the Northeast Project may be perceived as a preemptive measure 
to secure domestic and regional international stability of China.  Others argue that 
China’s ambitions are that since Jiang Zemin assumed authority, China has pursued a 
fundamental hegemonic structure to assume the sovereignty over Taiwan and the South 
China sea, intends to expand its territory up to the size of the old Qing dynasty; with 
China’s intent on becoming a hegemonic power to replace the current Pan-Americanism 
spread out to the international community with a Pan-Chinese structure.126   
Regardless of China’s ambitious intent and the follow-on reactions of the 
government toward South Korea’s official complaints, China’s government already has 
executed and completed the project.  Public sentiment already has formed and initiated 
nationalistic approaches.  Therefore, the project was initially a threat-causing issue that 
created vulnerability between the two nations’ informational relationships, in the public-
sentiment perspective.  The solution for the issue has already been started in a diplomatic 
relationship by agreeing to a mutual understanding.  However, constant efforts to form a 
cooperative and harmonious public sentiment must be followed.  Additionally, a concrete 
understanding and detailed administrative policy would be beneficial to resolve the 
ambiguous intent of both nations for the future.  For example, agreement on the 
separation of sovereignty in history from one’s territorial issues should be achieved.    
                                                 
126 Steven W. Mosher, Hegemony: China’s Plan to Dominate Asia and The World (San Francisco: 
Encounter Books, 2000), 61–95. 
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c. Military Aspect of the Northeast Project 
The military aspect provides yet another, more threatening aspect related 
to the Northeast Project.  The PLA Ground Forces have been changed to lighter, more 
mobile and effective forces.  Additionally, large numbers of forces still are located in the 
Northeast area that is the core region for the Northeast Project: Manchuria.  It may be 
considered a rationale for China to have those troops assigned there, but for South and 
North Korea it may be viewed as a signal of intent for possible future coercive action. 
South Korea has an alternative or option, which is to strengthen the alliance with the 
United States so as to deter possible Chinese coercive solutions.  But, the impact of this 
might be a shift in the United States Forces Korea mission from defending South Korea 
from a North Korean invasion to confronting other possible threats in Asia.127  
Currently, North Korea and China may share an ideological identity.  
However the two nations have not conducted any combined military exercises regarding 
refugees or borderline security.  If such military exercises were to be implemented they 
would threaten South Korea, Japan and other neighbors.  Therefore, it may not be the best 
option.  If military factors have no other options other than to station vast numbers of 
forces in the area, China should become more active in implementing a mitigating 
solution in other aspects of its relationship with South Korea.  Otherwise, the credibility 
of, and the relationship itself may be undermined.    
d. Economic Aspect of the Northeast Project 
Economically, the Northeast Project has delivered a negative effect to the 
relationship with South Korea.  But, in spite of grievances created in public sentiment, 
data from South Korean MOFAT, in the year 2004 to 2006, show that total trade still 
increased.128  In other words, the Northeast Project did not greatly affect the economic 
relationship between the two nations.  These data are not sufficient enough counter argue 
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that the Northeast Project did not affect South Korean national security.  However, the 
project still contains a possibility of cleavage in the relationship of the two, or at least an 
aggravation to the overall relationship, by allowing an unfavorable prejudice in China’s 
policy.129  This argument shows how the Northeast Project may affect the two nations’ 
relationship in sentiment.  
e. Conclusion 
In conclusion, China’s Northeast Project, despite its peaceful resolution, 
created a diplomatic collision, prolonged public mistrust and grievances, and indirectly 
affected the possibility of cleavage.  Furthermore, PLA modernization and relocation 
may pose a threat, not immediately but in the longer term, especially for a (future) unified 
Korean peninsula, because relocating modernized PLA ground forces from current 
locations to other areas seems unlikely.  
3. Conclusion 
The Socotra Rock dispute and the Northeast Project have, in the main, created 
negative public sentiment. Especially since the Korean public has observed that the 
nominal policy approach has been to distort history and use public sentiment in lieu of 
seeking a precise diplomatic resolution, this has not resulted in a positive or productive 
solution.  It may have provided short-term interest for China’s national security, but it has 
created long-term prejudice and mistrust between the two states.  Furthermore, PLA 
modernization and increased capabilities creates ambiguity about China’s future action 
regarding security issues.  This fuels mistrust.   
Given these conditions today, South Korea has one option that is strengthening its 
alliance with the United States to reaffirm South Korean security while prevent and 
avoiding conflicts with its neighboring nations.  This may mandates United States 
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participation.  If this mistrust and reduced credibility toward China exists over the long 
run (more than five years) an effective resolution would be more complex.   
Even though the PLA continues to modernize and the probability of China 
assuming a global role as a world power is likely in the future, such changes will still take 
years. So, too, building a multi-service military capability for power-projection and 
promoting national power at a distance also requires time.  Therefore, the PLA 
modernization that is developing China’s capability to impose or even coerce China’s 
national strategic interest toward South Korea may be interpreted as a possible direct 
threat to long-term South Korean security.   
Unless China and South Korea develop a remarkable, peaceful relationship and 
build security credibility between their two forces, South Korea should be prepared for a 
possible collision with China to protect its (South Korea’s) sovereignty.  Ideally more 
active and constant confidence and security building measures will be undertaken by both 
states to resolve issues and form a productive and cooperative relationship for the 
common prosperity of the region.  Since the problem includes informational aspects and 
public sentiment, it is essential, in addition to enhancing the top leadership’s 
relationships, that practical level people-to-people relationships to be enhanced as well.  
This process of resolution may take a long time.    
B. INDIRECT THREAT TO SOUTH KOREAN SECURITY 
The previous section investigated direct threats to South Korea by China, using 
two cases as examples of the concept.  In this section, indirect threats will be considered. 
The Taiwan issue will be examined as an indirect threat case for South Korea.  It is likely 
that the conditions and conclusion will suggest that South Korean security is affected by 
the relationship of China to other nations in the region.   
1. Taiwan and South China Sea Issue 
The Taiwan issue has been a constant issue between Mainland China’s 
government and the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan.  To summarize the 
issue, China pursues a one China policy that includes Taiwan and its ROC government. 
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However, the ROC government maintains its de-facto independence and clings to its 
claim of being the legitimate government of China.  Moreover, the United States seeks to 
ensure that conflict does not escalate on this issue and strives to deter escalation by either 
side.130    
Any military conflict over the Taiwan issue may conclude in a disastrous result 
between the PRC and the ROC.  However, the PRC’s cost of pursuing a military conflict 
with Taiwan may be significant, especially with regard to South Korea, Japan, and the 
United States.  The most likely aspects to be affected by military actions in the Taiwan 
Strait might be the economic relations and prosperity that China enjoys with South 
Korea, Japan, and even the United States.  All of these states are major sources of capital, 
markets and other essential elements for China’s economic development.  However, the 
focus for this thesis is on the possible consequences for South Korean security if such a 
disastrous condition were to occur. 
Currently, China’ s military capability is strong enough to execute joint operations 
on Taiwan.  Furthermore, the PLAN is striving to become a blue-water navy, both to 
deter threats and actively to defend national strategic interests further away from its 
coastline.  Additionally, the PLAAF is pursuing extended operational range activities as 
well. All of this allows China to defend its national strategy at a greater distance from its 
coastal line, including a possible Taiwan conflict, which may be interpreted as China’s 
efforts to hinder a United States quick-response, or involvement by military forces in a 
conflict on the Taiwan issue.  Furthermore, PLA modernizations of information warfare 
and high-tech military assets that allow rapid and decisive military operational capability 
also may hinder the United States’ effectiveness and involvement in the possible crisis.  
 If Beijing imposes coercive military policy on Taipei, several conditions may 
develop.  First, South Korea may be pressured to choose sides—either to support Taipei, 
or at least to stay neutral.  Considering the economic relationship between South Korea 
and China, either choosing a side or staying neutral could create a dilemma.  This is 
because choosing Mainland China’s side, or even staying neutral might contradict the 
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United States’ course of action or response. Conversely, choosing Taiwan, along with the 
United States, might force South Korea to forsake economic interests or benefits it is 
enjoying from the China relationship.  In addition to the economic aspect, South Korea 
may have to assess any potential military help to Taiwan as well. Providing any military 
support, including logistical support, might legitimize Chinese actions to support North 
Korea with military aid as well as forces or supplies. In the worst case, it might support 
some approach to North Korea’s military for an action against South Korea.   
If South Korea were to decide not to intervene by any means, would be likely to 
be contradicting the United States’ approach, and North Korea might use such conditions 
to grow anti-American sentiment in the South Korean public.  Second, if United States 
forces in the region change missions from the defense of South Korea against the North 
Korean threat to a wider Asian regional security mission, and decide to intervene in the 
possible military conflict between China and Taiwan, then a power vacuum, or 
vulnerability may be created due to the United States forces’ deployment off the 
peninsula into the conflict area.  Under such conditions, the North might seek to take 
advantage.131    
In any case, military conflict between China and Taiwan, and probably the United 
States, would undermine South Korea’s security in diplomacy, information, military, and 
economy.  Therefore, without any capability and authority, and just as third party, South 
Korea’s security might be undermined due to the decision by China on the Taiwan issue. 
In other words, China represents an indirect security threat to South Korea.  
A South China Sea dispute involving several Southeast Asian nations could 
follow the same logic as the Taiwan issue.  Therefore, it could be another flashpoint to 
undermine the security of South Korea. 
Another element or aspect for South Korean security is that South Korea must 
constantly develop or improve its military capability.  First, given the possibility of a 
power vacuum on the peninsula, South Korea must be able to rely on its own military 
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assets to deter and defend against a North Korean attack, especially in face of United 
States forces possible attention to a Taiwan conflict.  Second, the South China Sea is a 
major SLOC for South Korea. It also is a major route for South Korean petro resource 
supply routes.  Creating any unsafe conditions on the sea line may cause severe damage 
to the South Korean economy.  Therefore, the Taiwan and South China Sea issues 
embody the possibility of indirect security threats to South Korea. 
2. Conclusion 
Taiwan and the South China Seas directly relate to China, Taiwan, Vietnam, other 
Southeast Asian nations, and the United States, as long as the United States intends to 
intervene.  A possible effect of a Taiwan and South China Sea crises on South Korea is 
the concern to preserve its secure maritime transportation routes for trade and natural 
resources: its economy.  On the other hand, the greatest impact of such conflicts may be 
their indirect effect due to the political and economic relationships with other nations.   
The PLA’a focus on aggressive and extensive modernization does relate to South Korea’s 
security. This is so first, because of the PLA’s ambiguous posture and its lack of 
transparency for intent or usage; second, because of the PLA’s pursuit of advanced 
capabilities that effectively create a de facto coercive military policy in the region and 
one, which could be triggered by a Taiwan conflict, despite the existence and intentions 
of the United States.   
Therefore, if or when the PLA acquires sufficient capability or national power in 
the region, it is possible that China might implement or allow a crisis to escalate into a 
military conflict to support its own purposes. This possibility suggests that the PLA can, 
or inevitably, will become an indirect security threat to South Korea. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The PLA modernization and its way forward is likely to continue to develop and 
its military to acquire more rapid, effective, and decisive capabilities.   The development 
of PLA Ground Forces to be projected faster, with more capability, plus PLAN and 
PLAAF extended operational ranges and capabilities, plus the effective integration of 
PLA Ground, PLAN, and PLAAF as joint forces continues. China is building a regional 
force with effective power projection capability. 
The relationship of South Korea and China and with the United States shows that 
there are many cleavages between South Korea and China, and even with the United 
States.  The most significant aspect is that South Korea’s economic dependency on China 
has grown, just as South Korea’s military dependency on the United States remains. 
However, such dependencies are inevitable for the security and prosperity of South 
Korea.  However, there remains an underlying vulnerability first visible in information 
aspects that are related to public sentiments.   
Understanding the relationships of South Korea, China, and the United States, 
also highlighted several issues, which support the conclusion that China’s military 
development and modernization creates both direct and indirect threats to South Korean 
security.   
In spite of the informational and economic aspects of South Korea and China’s 
relationship, the Socotra Rock dispute and the Northeast Project may be considered as 
direct threats imposed by China on South Korean security.  The Socotra Rock incident 
included the possibility of escalation of the issue into a territorial dispute, however 
diplomatic resolution was properly implemented.  However, the informational problem 
related to negative public sentiment still exists.  The Northeast Project also has been 
officially resolved diplomatically. However, there is deep negative public sentiment on 
both sides, which lingers even now.  Therefore, both nations require proactive efforts to 
ease such sentiments.    
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The indirect aspect or threat is a serious consideration for South Korea. In spite of 
China’s economic relationship with Taiwan, vulnerability still exists, because of lingering 
issues of sovereignty and territorial disputes between Beijing and Taipei.  China’s use of 
military force in a Taiwan dispute is quite possible. In the South China Sea, it is also 
possible today and in the future that China will again resort to the use of its military force 
for conflict resolution.   Burles and Shulsky argue that “[T]he goal has been to control 
islands and construct infrastructure (for the ultimate purpose of vindicating its territorial 
claims) rather than to achieve an objective by psychological or political means.”132 
Additionally, natural resource and territorial arguments are embedded in the issue.  In 
other words, it is possible that China may impose coercive military resolution in a South 
China Sea dispute.   
The major difference between direct and indirect security threat imposed by 
China toward South Korea is the existence of sovereignty and territorial disputes, because 
China has signaled its strong intent not to tolerate threats or disputes on these issues.  
Direct threats, according to the cases, were resolved, but still require further efforts.  
Indirect threats have not been resolved but instead have been postponed with higher 
possibilities of military threat to South Korea.  Therefore, indirect threats may be 
considered as more significant threats to South Korea. 
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